Experimentation in Literature in the 1920s Essay -- essays papers

Experimentation in belles-lettres in the 1920s The year 1920 opened a decennium that proven to be like none other forward it, a decade that was to shake the world. The 1920s changed the way the world worked, for it was a time of denudation and proceeding done improvisation and experimentation, when in the past everything had been carefully overweight over, and archetype forth thoroughly. A few of these discoveries and achievements, and the men who accomplished them, put up out from the rest. With pile Joyce and the publication of his massive masterpiece Ulysses, T.S. Eliot, and the publication of his brilliant and stupefy poem The emaciate ground, and F. Scott Fitzgerald and the publication of his complex and tragic The outstanding Gatsby, the 1920s were hence a time of amazing discovery and achievement through experimentation and improvisation. T.S. Eliot produce The Waste Land in 1922, and the world of numbers changed forever. hitherto his experiments i n form and style began long before The Waste Land was ever published. Eliot was developing his unique style, as show in some(prenominal) of his early poems. Noticeable among these poems is the powerful work The Love telephone call of J. Alfred Prufrock, which have much critical acclaim after being published in America. The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, or just Prufrock, as many another(prenominal) critics called it demonstrated his combination of blatant pessimism and withering hopes and desires with the sterility of modern life. another(prenominal) majestic feature in the poem was the juxtaposition of the brilliantly professional poetize with the cliched, something that made his style very unique never before had anyone so daringly put the common language and the esoteric in concert in such a fashion. Prufrock effectively presen... ...ng Company, 1996Anderson, Chester, James Joyce. New York, Thames/ Hudson, 1967.Brownstone, David and Irene Frank, Timeline of the ordina l Century. Canada, Little-Brown and Company, 1996.Daniel, Clifton, editor, business relationship of the Twentieth Century. get together States, Harper and Row, 1990.Daniels, Jonathan, The Time Between the Wars. United States, Doubleday, 1966.Day, Martin, A Handbook of American literary works. New York, Crane, Russak, and Company, Inc., 1975.Ellman, Richard, James Joyce. United States, Oxford Press, 1959.F. Scott Fitzgerald, Gales Discovering Authors, 1995.James Joyce, Gales Discovering Authors, 1995.Severn, William, The destruction of the Roaring Twenties. United States, Simon and Shuster, 1969.Tate, Allen, editor, T.S. Eliot and His Work. United States, University of the South, 1966.T.S. Eliot, Gales Discovering Authors, 1995. Experimentation in Literature in the 1920s Essay -- essays papersExperimentation in Literature in the 1920s The year 1920 opened a decade that proved to be like none other before it, a decade that was to shake the world. The 1920s changed the way the world worked, for it was a time of discovery and achievement through improvisation and experimentation, when in the past everything had been carefully labored over, and thought out thoroughly. A few of these discoveries and achievements, and the men who accomplished them, stand out from the rest. With James Joyce and the publication of his massive masterpiece Ulysses, T.S. Eliot, and the publication of his brilliant and stunning poem The Waste Land, and F. Scott Fitzgerald and the publication of his complex and tragic The Great Gatsby, the 1920s were indeed a time of amazing discovery and achievement through experimentation and improvisation. T.S. Eliot published The Waste Land in 1922, and the world of poetry changed forever. Yet his experiments in form and style began long before The Waste Land was ever published. Eliot was developing his unique style, as demonstrated in several of his early poems. Noticeable among these poems is the powerful work The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, which received much critical acclaim after being published in America. The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, or just Prufrock, as many critics called it demonstrated his combination of blatant pessimism and withering hopes and desires with the sterility of modern life. Another shocking feature in the poem was the juxtaposition of the brilliantly original verse with the cliched, something that made his style very unique never before had anyone so daringly put the common language and the esoteric together in such a fashion. Prufrock effectively presen... ...ng Company, 1996Anderson, Chester, James Joyce. New York, Thames/ Hudson, 1967.Brownstone, David and Irene Frank, Timeline of the Twentieth Century. Canada, Little-Brown and Company, 1996.Daniel, Clifton, editor, Chronicle of the Twentieth Century. United States, Harper and Row, 1990.Daniels, Jonathan, The Time Between the Wars. United States, Doubleday, 1966.Day, Martin, A Handbook of American Liter ature. New York, Crane, Russak, and Company, Inc., 1975.Ellman, Richard, James Joyce. United States, Oxford Press, 1959.F. Scott Fitzgerald, Gales Discovering Authors, 1995.James Joyce, Gales Discovering Authors, 1995.Severn, William, The End of the Roaring Twenties. United States, Simon and Shuster, 1969.Tate, Allen, editor, T.S. Eliot and His Work. United States, University of the South, 1966.T.S. Eliot, Gales Discovering Authors, 1995.

Essay --

caustic remark is a balanced combination of sarcasm, irony, humor, and rhetorical devices that all focus on mocking or ridiculing certain works. In The War invocation by Mark brace and The Battle of the Ants by Henry David Thoreau, both swindle works satire the glorification of war. In comparison, The War Prayer revolves roughly jingoism by displaying traces of shock, magnification and a juxtaposing heart whereas The Battle of the Ants exhibits a historical background through and through and through sarcasm, verisimilitude, and a mock-heroic tone. The War Prayer by Mark Twain satirizes through jingoism, one satirical device is shown through shock I come from the Throne-bearing a message from Almighty god (Twain 5. 53) as citizens listen in on a church table service in a country that is going to war the soldiers are organism granted triumph and safety by Gods messenger however a stranger interrupts and claims he is Gods messenger, Twain used outrageous details to startle and grab the readers attention showing a stranger demanding he is the messenger when sooner someone else is, thus plotting a twist in the act. Another satiric device that was used in Twains passing game is hyperbole in every breast burned the holy fire of patriotism (Twain 5. 2) the exaggeration was given its purpose to give the readers the image of the time of spacious and exalting excitement (Twain. 5. 1) that was happening in the unnamed town that was in the beginning of bloodshed. One more satirical device that was used in the The War Prayer is its juxtaposing tone Twain contrasts the praising and celebratory tone to the bitter tone at the end of the passage. At the beginning of the passage the tone is described as giddy and enthralling The country was up in arms, the war was on, in ... ...nts battle-cry was Conquer or die.(Thoreau 3. 22). Thoreau uses level and high-sounding vocabulary to persuade the reader that this crusade is not meaningless entirely glorifies the actua l fierceness of warriors in combat, resembling actual wars. In conclusion, the satirical pieces discussed dower common satirical techniques and differ in them as well. The War Prayer juggled around jingoism by using shock, hyperbole, and juxtaposing tone to give the passage multiple turnouts, resulting in a bathetic ending. The Battle of the Ants displayed its work through historical context using the satirical elements of sarcasm, verisimilitude, and a mock-heroic tone, thus resulting Thoreaus pompous writing to mocking historians who glorify war with detailed notes. both(prenominal) accomplish the glorification of war by portraying hyper-patriotism and elevated diction in unique ways as well.

The Bell Jar Essay -- Essays Papers

The gong Jar Peoples lives are shaped through and through their success and failure in their personal relationships with each other. The author Sylvia Plath demonstrates this in the novel, The buzzer Jar. This is the direct response of the damage of support from a loved unity, the leave out of support and encouragement, and lack of self confidence and insecurity in Esthers life-time in the The Bell Jar. It was shaped through her success and failures in her personal relationships between others and herself. d hotshot life, we often sustain approximately unity we loved and cared deeply for and supported us through life. This is demonstrated by the loss of a loved one when Esthers father died when she was nine. My German speaking father, dead since I was nine came from some manic-depressive hamlet in the Prussia. (Sylvia Plath page 27.) Esthers fathers death had showed that she was in hold of a father figure for love, support and to act as a model for her life. Esther grew up with only the one influence of a parent, hermother. frequently times the loss of a whizzship can be a great loss of support and confidence within our lives because we can lack them forever. This is demonstrated when Buddy Willard Esthers boyfriend break up. He told me that his annual worsening chest x-ray showed he had caught tuberculosis...in the Adirondacks (Sylvia Plath pg. 58.) Buddy andEsther break up ascribable to the fact that he was not very honest with her in umteen ways. He did not have the courage to admit to a real side of his character and not only that Buddy was diagnosed with an illness moreover he had other relationships aside from Esther. Therefore Esther see another loss of a loved one. Within life, we gain the support from someone that helps us get through life but often times leaves us when we need them most. This is proven when Doreen Esthers co-worker at the modeling magazine begins to set d experience contact with Esther through life Do reen is dissolving... none of them mean anything anymore (Sylvia Plath pg.17) Doreen begins to lose contact with Esther throughout life, just when Doreen had opened new doors to her. Esther was coming through a very difficult time in life, when Doreen started drifting away(p) from Esther. Once again, Esther experienced the loss and support of a great friend and advocate. Ones life is made up by framework. You gather friends and folks unitedly and ... ...a Plath page 93) After finding out that she had not made the musical composition course, Esther thought to herself that tied(p) before entering the essay, she knew she would not make the course. Proving that pull down before entering her essay for the college, she had no confidence in beingness accepted. After building confidence within herself, Esther decided to write an biography using herself as the heroine but she felt that she could not write a novel based on life because she felt she had not experienced it. How could I write about life...baby or even seen anybody die. (Sylvia Plath pg. 99) Thus, this proves that Esther did not even have the self confidence within herself to follow through with her own ambition of becoming a writer. During a journey through life one starts with a foundation to build on and decide on framework of ones life. In order to sustain and maintain life one needs a basis of love, support, food for thought and life to breath, looking and experience. If an individuals life is shaped and directed by the successes or failures of human relationship, without substance, one might as well seal up their life with a vacuum lid and live in a glass jar.

Cabbage vs. Lettuce

Not knowing the difference between the 2 is adequacy to irritate ere, and mistaking them for the otherwise is a square different direct of anger and f rustication that could possibly awaken from a pet peeve. It was key enough for her to make a whole blob post on the subject. Natural curiosity got the best of me as I then began to explore the e differences and akinities of these vegetables. Tang 2 Cabbage and lettuce argon actually from two sign efficiently different plant families to begin with.From first discern it is slightly difficult to immediately tell which of the Greg ens it is in a grip because of how similar their colors and executes are when cut, cooked, and pre eared. Starting off with the plunder, according to Bruce of weeklies, it baffles from the brassier CAE family of blossoming plants otherwise known as mustard flowers or the cabbage family. some other welkin species within the family include broccoli, cauliflower, radish, and turnips. Cab pages are oft en in the form of a decently puffy, round flower bud of leaves.It looks similar to its notorious cousin, the Brussels sprout, scarcely but more sizable. The cabbage leaves are compact, the kick, dense, and fibrous, so it is not as easy to bend anywhere or else it would break in half. W hen grown at a arm or at home, cabbages grow in a whole flower formation With extensive Ii eaves encircling the middle. To harvest it, raft naturally cut the cabbage Stem at the base, leave Eng the large outer leaves still intact to the stem, to collect the middle bud. As for lettuce, they come from the assistance family, also known as the sinful rower family.The other welkin species within assistance include chrysanthemum m and artichokes. Lettuce commonly divide a similar small cone shape with the artichoke, but the look eject come In a more sphere shape like the cabbage, as seen with the iceberg lettuce. The lea eves are more negotiable around the outer parts but a bit thicker along the mid dle, so it can be utilized as a revolve for some dishes. They can also be easily separated by simply pulling each leaf apart. When harvested, the whole lettuce plant is every dug up or cut off near the soil.As a result, the main aesthetic differences to note are the shape before and punk term harvesting, and the thickness or compactness of the leaves composition. How ever, they do not only differ aesthetically but also in taste and smell. The lettuce has a much high her water content Tang 3 Han cabbages, and that gives it the brisk feel when bitten into. Consensus entry, having a high water content, lettuce cannot be easily bear on by freezing canning, o r drying. On the bright side, that path it is also served fresh and majority of the time.Sadly, c Babbage may have a bitter taste and smell to them when either raw or cooked, but that does not stop us from making great dishes with them. On depend of the previous stated facts, each vegetable serves its own special bespeak in cooking. Majority of lettuce is eaten raw in salads and sandwiches, or used as Arians like cilantro on tacos. The reason for not using lettuce in cooking is mainly due to I TTS high water content. planning it in some ways may give some inapplicable results such as b Ewing too soggy.Chime is a common Korean recipe that serves as a fermented vegetable side dish with sextuple seasonings that utilizes cabbages often. The cabbage is able to defend its cry mushiness and absorb flavors through its density. The same could go for other dishes such a s the pop coleslaw. If you were to substitute the cabbage shreds with lettuce, the texture e of the meal would to have the low-set and crunchy feel, but a more wet and soft texture through hoot. Although, cabbages may win in cooking versatility, it does not render the lettuce as been g inferior.Going past the cooking and looking into the nutrition facts, the natural asphyxia session of both the cabbage and lettuce speak for their nutritio n. With the greater density y, the cabbage packs the higher calorie and dietary fiber count at tight three times the ammo aunt the same serving of lettuce can provide. Each of the greens are also great sources of vitamin A ( helps maintain lathe vision, white blood cells, and skin tissue), vitamin C (helps maintain he althea skin, bones, metabolism, and immune system), and potassium (assists with protein for blob odd and bones).

India Is My Country Essay

India is my bucolic, my motherland. I honor it and I am high-minded of it. India is a big country. In population it is second only to China. India has a rich and glorious past. Once it was the seat of learning. Students from all over the existence used to come here to study. Indian culture spread abroad. Indian goods had a ready market in foreign countries. It was a condemnation when India was a land of plenty. Times changed. India fell on evil days. brandish after wave of invaders came and plundered India. India became a slave country. The foreign rulers secondhand her as much as they could. India became independent in 1947. The foreign rulers went away. to a lower place the able leadership of Pt. Nehru the country marched towards progress. New industries were set up. Trade increased. in that location were difficulties in the beginning.Kashmir was overrun by the tribals. There were communal riots Millions of people were uprooted from their homes. India is the largest body politic of the world. We Indians enjoy freedom of speech, worship and press. All citizens have equal rights. India is rich in natural resources, yet her inhabitants ar poor. The mineral wealth of the country is unexplored. Under the Union Government, new industries are being set up. already Indian goods are being exported to other countries. New methods of agriculture are being used to increase food production. She has already become independent in food. In the field of science and literature, India has produced eminent people ilk Rabindra Nath Tagore, Sir C.V.Raman, Sir Jagdish Chandra Bose and Shri H.N.Bhabha. India is a peace loving country but she has to spend a huge amount on defence because there is danger from her neighbours, to wit Pakistan and China.The present Government under the new Prime Minister is stressful to befriend them. India is a land of villages with many languages but there is whizz in diversity. Ours is a secular state and all religions flourish nerve by side. My country abounds in glorious historical buildings and scenes. There is non a tourist who does not visit the Taj Mahal the symbol of eternal love or Kashmir, the heaven on earth. My country is a land of temples, mosques and churches, long rivers and vast fertile plains of the Ganges and the highest mountain of the world. It is the land where civilization runner blossomed in the world. Our fields are fed with perennial waters of the rivers.India is my foremost love and I would readily lay down my life for it if pauperism be.

A European Way of War

middle FOR EUROPEAN REFORM A EUROPEAN WAY OF WAR St change sur exhibit Everts, Lawrence freedwoman, Charles Grant, Francois Heisbourg, Daniel Keohane and Michael OHanlon just nigh the cheatditioned emotion The Centre for atomic issue 63an Re excogitate is a appreciate-tank devoted to improve the quality of the debate on the atomic number 63an nitty-gritty. It is a forum for community with ideas from Britain and across the snarftinent to discuss the m any(prenominal) social, governmental and e get a lineomic ch on the wholeenges liner europium. It seeks to contrive with similar bodies in different europiuman countries, North the States and elsewhere in the world. The conditioned emotional response is pro- europiuman merely non uncritical.It regards European consolidation as blown-uply bene? cial only when recognises that in many respects the inwardness does non melt down well. The CER therefore aims to promote radical ideas for clear uping the European Un ion. A European focusing of struggle ? Director CHARLES GRANT consultive BOARD PERCY BARNEVIK.. Ch haloman, AstraZeneca CARL BILDT. occasion Swedish Prime curate and Ch rail lineman, Nordic accident Ne iirks ANTONIO BORGES.. precedent Dean of INSEAD NICK BUTLER (CHAIR).. Group Vice electric chair, strategy, BP p. l. c. passkey DAHRENDORF actor con disco biscuitdden of St Antonys College, Oxford &038 EU Commissioner VERNON ELLIS.. supra study Chairman, Ac centimeure RICHARD HAASS.. President, Council on Foreign Relations LORD HANNAY Former Ambassador to the UN and the EU IAN HARGREAVESGroup Director of Corporate and frequent Affairs, BAA plc LORD HASKINS OF SKIDBY Former Chairman, Northern Foods FRANCOIS HEISBOURG Director, Fondation pour la exquisite Strategique CATHERINE KELLEHER.. Visiting Reoceanrch Professor, US Naval strugglef atomic number 18 College SIR JOHN KERR. Former Ambassador to the EU and US &038 former Permanent Under Secretary, FCO FIORELLA KOSTORIS PADOA SCHIOPPA.. Former President, Istituto di Studi e Analisi Economica RICHARD LAMBERT..Former Editor, Financial Times DAVID MARSH. Partner, Droege &038 Comp. AG DOMINIQUE MOISI old Advisor, Institut Francais des Relations Inter issuees JOHN MONKS Gen datel Secretary, ETUC DAME PAULINE NEVILLE-JONES.. Chairman, QinetiQ p. l. c. WANDA RAPACZYNSKI. President of Management Board, Agora SA LORD SIMON OF HIGHBURY.Former Minister for Trade and Competitiveness in Europe PETER SUTHERLAND Chairman, BP p. l. c. &038 Goldman Sachs Inter content ADAIR TURNER.. Vice Chairman, Merrill Lynch Holdings Ltd. Steven Everts, Lawrence freedwoman, Charles Grant, Francois Heisbourg, Daniel Keohane and Michael OHanlon Published by the Centre for European Reform (CER), 29 Tufton Street, capital of the United Kingdom, SW1P 3QL call up + 44 20 7233 1199, Facsimile + 44 20 7233 1117, email&160protected org. uk, www. cer. org. uk CER MAY 2004 ? ISBN 1 901229 54 8ABOUT THE AUTHORS Steven Everts is a aged(a ) research familiar spirit at the Centre for European Reform, and director of its transatlantic programme. His overbold-fang guide CER publications include Engaging Iran a test show window for EU appearside(prenominal) indemnity (March 2004) The EU and the inwardness East a call for perform (January 2003) and Shaping a credible EU foreign constitution (February 2002). Lawrence Freedman is professor of con ecstasyd studies and vice principal (Research) at Kings College, London. He is the author of a number of books on Cold War history and coeval security issues, approximately recently Deterrence (Polity, 2004).He is similarly of? cial historian of the Falklands motility. Charles Grant has been director of the Centre for European Reform since 1998. He was previously defensive structure editor and capital of Belgium correspondent of The Economist. His virtually recent CER publication is Transatlantic rift how to bring the two sides unneurotic (July 2003). Francois Heisbourg is director of the Paris- ground Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, and chairman of both the International Institute of Strategic Studies and the Geneva Centre for Security polity. He is besides a member of the CERs advisory board.Daniel Keohane is the research crevice for security and disaffirmation policy at the Centre for European Reform. He previously worked at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris, and at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, in working capital DC. He is the author of The EU and armaments co-operation (CER celestial latitude 2002). Michael OHanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. He previously worked for the US Congress. In his ten years at Brookings, he has written on US self-denial schema and the defense lawyers bud occur, the Kosovo war, missile self-renunciation, forces technology, space warf be and m otherwiseland security.AUTHORS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would l ike to thank EDS for their support of this project. They also owe specific thanks to Kate Meakins for designing this publication, and to Aurore Wanlin and John Springford for their research help. In addition, the CER is thankful to the German Marshall Fund of the US for backup the CERs transatlantic programme. Charles Grant would like to thank the following for their help capital of Seychelles Billing, Gavin Cook, Marta Dassu, Paul Johnston, Edwina Moreton and Simon Webb. ? Copyright of this publication is held by the Centre for European Reform.You whitethorn non copy, reproduce, republish or circulate in any management the content from this publication except for your give personal and noncommercial use. some(a)(prenominal) other use implores the prior written permission of the Centre for European Reform. Contents Ab go forth the authors Authors acknowledgements Foreword 1 Introduction Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane 2 move the EU develop an sound array dogma? Lawrenc e Freedman 3 The European Security Strategy is non a security scheme Francois Heisbourg 4 The Ameri corporation commission of war the lessons for Europe Michael OHanlon 5 Conclusion the signi? ance of European disproof Charles Grant 55 41 27 13 1 Foreword EDS has worked for many years in partnership with the ministries of defensive measure and the gird forces on both sides of the Atlantic. We currently name colleagues stationed in the Middle East, in support of UK forces. We be, therefore, delighted to be musical accompaniment this new CER work, A European panache of war. In the best usances of the CER, it has brought in concert key experts from both sides of the Atlantic to debate the emerging of European refutal. What is salient(ip) closely the contri thoions is the high level of chordment on what Europe assumes to do.They avoid the stereotyping of the US-Europe relationship as a form of labour in which as Francois Heisbourg says the US kicks in doors and th e EU cleans the star sign. each(prenominal) agree that Europe moldiness urgently improve its forces capabilities if it is to translate the goal of efficacious multilateralism from rhetoric into humankind. It must reduce the home base of its land armies and the number of duplicate equipment programmes. Europe must begin commit in technologies and equipment that complement sooner than duplicate US investment. Equally, the authors highlight the lessons and take ins which Europe can offer to the US in he prosecution of illicit war, for congressman in deterring insurgents and terrorists. These essays provide a timely reminder of how the US and Europe are united by a super C indispens ableness to tackle international terrorism and proliferation, as well as their underlying causes. They all agree on the postulate for Europe to be get along with a to a greater extent than effective phalanx power and to allot much(prenominal) state for its own backyard. simply they debunk some of the myths associated with the debate. All agree that Europe rent not spend as much as the US or copy Americas force structure and article of faith in e actually respect.As Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane focussing, a European way of war does not pixilated either the creation of an EU army under Brussels control, or the end of the NATO army alliance. This work is a blue-chip contri saveion to the current debate on the early of European demur. Its prescriptions on how Europe can play an effective war machine section in world affairs deserve to be taken up by Europes allureers. Graham Lay Managing Director EDS disproof 1 Introduction Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane The idea of a European way of war is controversial. Many defence commentators and of? ials assume that the phrase is a metaphor for two, every bit undesirable, outcomes an EU army under the control of Brussels and the end of NATO. The world is that the EU pull up stakes not pretend its own arm y for decades to come if ever. Nor get out NATOs status as Europes pre-eminent defence organisation change any time soon. Most discussions on the incoming of European defence, when cast in much(prenominal) terms, generate more heat than light. at that place is, however, a genuinely need for Europeans to think more creatively about what kind of defence cap tycoon they want. What sorts of missions do they envisage? And how do they expect their forces to operate in the future?European governments need to wreak a tough assessment of the additional tasks they want their armies to perform, alongside traditionalistic peace finding. Clearly, Europe cannot hope to copy the American nest to warfare, with its heavy stress on technology and full spectrum dominance the ability to defeat any enemy in every conceivable category of weaponry. The budgetary constraints are simply withal great. except equally, the Europeans should not demonstrate to emulate the Americans article of b elief or force structure in their entirety even if they had illimitable specie because Europe has very unalike trategic priorities. For a range of historical and policy-making reasons, Europeans do not share all of Americas security policy goals. And barely American belief, tactics and capabilities expect the benchmark for nearly all European discussions on defence policy. 2 A European way of war Introduction 3 Such constant, and for the virtually part unfavourable, comparisons with the US tend to th track a harmful sense of powerlessness and resignation among European defence of? cials. The European countries control very different forces traditions, and they draw great difficulties finding money for new defence equipment.Despite these jobs, can European governments develop more innovative and ambitious defence policies? The answer is yes, but moreover if European defence ministries develop their own characteristic access code to warfare. European Council, Bru ssels, A secure Europe in a better world European Security Strategy, December 12th 2003. 1 warfare peace sustaining, nation-building and counter-insurgency. hence the Pentagon could learn a plenty from European scrams and ways of operating. Our American contributor, Michael OHanlon, argues that the Pentagon is al soldiers personnel learning firm from its post-con? ct get under ones skin in Iraq. He stresses that stabilisation missions should not be seen as less authorised than those involving high-intensity warfare. And he argues that the greatest threat to the health of the US army in the coming years is insuf? cient numbers of phalanx to help with nationbuilding. He adds that the dif? culties that US soldiers face when working with technologically backward European ally are a unplayful but secondary problem. Freedman and OHanlon agree that both American and European fortify forces need a better mixture of regular warfighting capabilities and peacekeeping skills. sim ply politicians in Europe should take note and take heart that such(prenominal)(prenominal)(prenominal) improvements need not mean broad summations in defence budgets. The 2 Based on estimates governments of the EU-25 collectively spend in the SIPRI Yearbook approximately S180 billion ($220 billion) a year on 2003, Armaments, defence, which is a signi? cant sum up of money. 2 disarmaments and For all its timidnesses, the EU remains the worlds planetary security, Oxford University second highest spender after the US, which devotes Press, Oxford, 2003. some S330 billion ($four hundred billion) to defence.OHanlon recommends that over the next decade EU governments should spend 10 per cent of their annual defence budgets on speci? c types of equipment. These include long-range disco biscuit planes and ships, unmanned aerial vehicles, and precision-guided missiles. To pay for this, he argues, defence ministries should cut their custody by a quarter, and focus on exploitation h ighly expert beset parade. If defence ministries followed this plan, by 2015 Europe would nurse more than 200,000 high-quality, nonrecreational soldiers, able to operate at briefly notice anywhere around the globe.At the moment the US can send about 400,000 lay downward(a) serviceman The European security schema, ready by EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, provides a good basis for thinking about a European progression to warfare. 1 But, as Francois Heisbourg points out in this pamphlet, that security strategy contains some glaring gaps. He argues that the EU should do terce things in finical draw up a complementary strategy for the EUs internal security audit the impact of European development programmes on security in recipient countries and start working on an EU array principle.In his essay, Lawrence Freedman interrogates the utility of an EU soldiery doctrine, and concludes that it would be redundant. He thinks it unlikely that 25 European governments co uld ever agree on a meaningful doctrine. But Britain and France could take the wind instrument, he argues, in de? ning a distinctly European military machine contribution to dealing with global security problems. London and Paris are the only European capitals that fix bucket along their own military trading trading operations in recent years, sometimes in very demanding environments.And, unlike the other Europeans, the french and the British al create from raw stuff endure highly developed military doctrines of their own. Freedman also argues that, even though the US is the worlds predominant military power, European soldiers are frequently better than American ones at many of the missions that get over contemporary 4 A European way of war 5 around the world, out of a total of about 650,000. But at once the EU-25 can barely deploy 85,000, out of a total of 1. 2 trillion ground soldiers. 3 From both a defence devisers point of lot, and that of the taxpayer, Europes arm ies need 3 These ? ures do not include air force or urgent reform. ocean forces personnel. The total number of the US fortify forces is approximately 1. 4 million state. The 25 EU governments confirm almost 2 million universe in their total build up forces. Figures establish on estimates in the The armament Balance 2003-2004, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London 2004. Recent developments in Brussels Heisbourg, Freedman and OHanlon all agree that in dominancement a European approach to warfare is a good idea, provided collar basic conditions are met ?Europes two pre-eminent military powers, Britain and France, must take the lead in de? ning a European approach to war. several(prenominal) EU governments may balk at having to follow an approach that would be de? ned to a blown-up extent by British and cut doctrine. However, Europe is better off with a sound military doctrine than a meaningless governmental compromise. In their approach to warfare, Europ eans should learn from the US approach, and from American experiences in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. European armies should be able to work well with American soldiers.However, Europes armies do not contain to copy US forces in every respect. European defence ministries need to retain their traditional peacekeeping skills, spot simultaneously building up their war-fighting p wranglingess. The EU needs to develop the internal aspects of its security and defence policy. In finical, European governments work to think about how to join up the discordant policy instruments which they need in the fight against global terrorism. EU governments need to ensure that their law enforcement, foreign and defence policies work in concert more effectively.The good news is that NATO and the EU are already taking move that allow for help their members to develop a European approach to warfare. At NATOs 2002 Prague summit, President scrubbing called on the Europeans to increase their military power by creating a NATO solvent Force (NRF). European governments followed his lead, approving a plan for a force of 21,000 elite military man, backed by supporting air and sea components, to be ready by 2006. This force depart enable NATO to train in a serious shooting war, in addition to its current peacekeeping work.By the end of 2003, NATO governments had already committed 9,000 troops to the response force, including 1,700 French soldiers. The NRF pass on be generally European the US accounts for only 300 (3 per cent) of the troops so far committed. 4 uppercases message to its allies has been clear Europe must increase its ability to undertake tough war-? ghting tasks if NATO is to remain central to US defence policy. NATOs repartee Force is goading the Europeans to prepare some of their troops for the most demanding types of military mission. 4 Spain is the self-aggrandisinggest contributor to the NRF, with 2,200 troops.Germany is alter 1,100 soldiers. can vass Luke Hill, union launches triservice speedy Response Force, Janes Defence Weekly, October 22nd 2003. ? ? In February 2004, the British, French and German governments proposed that the EU should be able to deploy nightclub betrothal root words, each consisting of 1,500 troops, and deployable within two weeks. Each battle group would be able to draw on extensive air and naval assets, including transference and logistical support. The rule for these EU combat units is to give the UN the rapid reaction capability that it currently lacks. The UN usually manages to ? d peacekeepers who can practice of law a cease? re or peace accord. But it a great deal cannot ? nd troops available to form an intervention force. It needs to be able to draw on a few battalions which are ready and able to ? y into a con? ict zone and impose peace. For caseful, the UN was unavailing to intervene quickly enough in East Timor in 1999. The Bush administration is unlikely to provide the UN with U S forces for this kind of task. Currently the joined States has only two 6 A European way of war Introduction 7 See http//www. un. org/ Depts/dpko/dpko/ contributors/Countries SummaryFeb2004. df. 5 soldiers claimd in UN-run peacekeeping operations (out of a total of 42,000 soldiers, of which 3,650 are from the EU-25). 5 If the US is nonvoluntary to provide peacekeepers, it is even less likely to cause elite forces available for UN interventions. But the EU could be impulsive to help the UN countries such as Britain and France discombobulate highly trained forces which can move into a war-zone at short notice. And European governments care much more than the US does about the UNs ability to act in geographical welkins that may not be of fundamental strategic importance.This is why the EU sent a small UN-mandated intervention force to Bunia in Congo in June 2003. And in April 2004 the EU considered the possibility of sending a UN-backed intervention force to the Dafur field of Sudan, where more than 650,000 people had ? ed killings, rape and looting by Arab militias. EU defence ministers agreed to the battle group initiative at their coming together in April 2004. They now have until 2007 to establish these forces and may do so in three ways. First, a government could impute together a national battle group.Only France and Britain could do this easily, although Germany, Spain and Italy should be able to develop their own combat units. Second, relatively large countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands could become lead or fabric nations for a battle group. Smaller countries would then cede some troops or equipment to plug gaps that the lead rural could not ? ll. The third option would be for several countries to come together to form truly international units, similar to the Strasbourg-based Eurocorps, which unites soldiers from Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain.For a smaller realm which does not want to plug into a particular le ad nation, a multinational unit might be politically more appealing. For object lesson, the Nordic and Baltic countries could decide to form a Baltic battle group. But multinational battle groups need not be regional. The EUs non-aligned countries, for example, might want to form their own. Austria, Finland and Ireland are of similar military strength, and they could ? nd that co-operating with fellow neutrals or else than NATO members would avoid embarrassing questions regarding their neutral status.In any case the creation of these battle groups like the NATO Response Force should help Europeans to think more alike on how they conduct warfare. Moreover, this confinement should reinforce NATOs Response Force the equivalent troops would be available to the EU and NATO. During the summer of 2004, they EU allow set up a new agency. The defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments agency will try to do two things, both of which will help the Europeans to develop a common approach to defence. It will seek to improve European military capabilities and to enhance armaments co-operation among the member-states.Unlike a typical national armaments agency, this new body will not have a procurement budget. So a better short verbal description would be to call it a capabilities agency, since it will bring together the separate worlds of research, development and procurement. The agencys most important role will be political, in assessing member-states progress towards meeting their capability commitments. everywhere the last few years, the Europeans progress towards modernising and re-equipping their armies has been painfully slow.In 2002, EU governments agreed to a European capabilities action plan (ECAP), which committed them to acquiring various sorts of equipment, such as transport planes and precision-guided missiles. The agency will evaluate and report per year on the member-states progress towards meeting these commitments. At mar ch, the agency looks set to keep these reports confidential. That would be a shame. If those reports were made public, the agency could name and shame the member-states which renege on on pledges, and thus put them under pressure to deliver. 8 A European way of war Introduction 9Finally, European governments are imputable to reach agreement on an EU constitution in June 2004. This will probably include articles on structured co-operation, EU jargon for a process that allows a small group of member-states to move forward in the area of defence. Given that EU countries have, and will always have, very different military capabilities, closer co-operation amongst a smaller group reads sense. Quite unconnected from the much-documented transatlantic gap, there is also a large capabilities gulf mingled with EU member-states a gulf that will widen with the accession of ten new members in May 2004. A revised version of the engage protocol listing the criteria for joining structured co- operation can be represent at http//ue. eu. int/igcpdf/en/03/c g00/cg00057-re01. en03. pdf. and demanding nature of future missions. The EU undertook its ? rst military missions in Macedonia and Congo in 2003. These experiences have already helped defence ministries to biddingise which kinds of equipment they need most urgently, and what types of skills their troops should develop. Towards the end of 2004, the EU is due to take over the peacekeeping in Bosnia from NATO this mission will be extremely dif? ult, including, for example, the hunt for the indicted Bosnian Serb general, Radovan Karadzic. Much more than the Congo or Macedonia operations, Bosnia will be a crucial test of the EUs military mettle. The enlargement of the EU brings it closer to the arc of instability that runs around its eastern, south-eastern and southern ? anks. Romania and Bulgaria are hoping to join the EU in 2007, magical spell Turkey, Croatia and other countries of the westerly Balkans are likel y to enter at a later stage. The EU will therefore have many weak and malfunctioning states on its borders.It is bound to become more involved in countries such as Belarus, Moldova and Georgia. Across the Atlantic, US priorities will remain focused on countries such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea, and con? icts such as China-Taiwan and India-Pakistan. upper-case letter will be opposed to become too involved in con? icts around the EUs eastern and southern borders. The EU will need to develop a more effective set of policies for stabilize North Africa, the Balkans and the countries that lie between the Union and Russia. Many of these policies will involve trade, aid and political dialogue.But EU strategy towards its near foreign will also have to include a military component. Europeans should not expect the US to put out ? res in their own backyard. After all, the principal rationale for the Anglo-French initiative at St Malo in 1998 which begat the European Security and Defence P olicy was to improve the EUs poor performance in coping with the Balkan crises of the 1990s. The EUs efforts to tackle con? icts in its near abroad may require more than mere peacekeeping. For example, if the delicateThat said, the current wording of the blueprint constitution sets targets for participation in the avant-garde which are relatively piano to meet. For example, the draft says that one of the criteria for participation is to supply by 2007 all or part of a combat unit that can be deployed in between ? ve and thirty days. 6 In fact, these combat units are the same types of force as those envisaged in the battle groups plan that EU defence ministers approved in April 2004. However, some member-states will probably stay out of the structured co-operation, because they lack the assets or the ambition to take part.The defence inner circle will in some respects resemble the eurozone some countries remain foreign because they do not satisfy the criteria, and others becaus e they choose to do so. Structured co-operation will help the emergence of a European approach to warfare like the NRF and the battle groups, the concept encourages other countries to emulate what the British and French fortify forces do. The transatlantic case for a European way of war Innovations such as the NATO Response Force and the EU battle groups should, together with some institutional innovations, enhance Europes military clout.But probably the most important factor driving military reform in Europe will be the growing number 10 A European way of war Introduction 11 site in Kosovo turned into a civil war, the EU should be ready to intervene with forces that could separate the warring factions. In such situations, British soldiers would be fighting alongside those from France, Germany, Italy and Spain, but not necessarily with American troops. If the Europeans were able to undertake that kind of robust military intervention autonomously, transatlantic relations would bene fit. For the Pentagon would have one less region to worry about.Furthermore, the more effective the Europeans military graphics, the more likely is the US to use NATO not only for peacekeeping but also for high-intensity interventions. The future of EU defence policy All the authors of this pamphlet are worried about the risk of a transatlantic division of labour namely the idea that Europe should do the peacekeeping and America ? ght the wars. But they all reject that notion, both as a description of the present and as a prescription for the future. The experience of Iraq has already forced the US to rethink its approach to post-con? ict operations.Having sometimes sneered at them, the Pentagon is now learning that peacekeeping, nation-building, and counter-insurgency should play a larger role in its military doctrine. Mean term, as the EU takes on more military missions, its defence ministries are themselves engaged in a learning process. They are beginning to see that they will need more sophisticate equipment, and be prepared for serious combat missions. They know that they will not always be able to count on the US to do the war-? ghting for them. It is unbent that the US and Europe currently have very different doctrines and priorities.But experiences on the ground will probably encourage both sides to cover their respective weaknesses post-con? ict stabilisation for the US and war-? ghting for the Europeans. In the long run this may lead to some extent to doctrinal convergence. European soldiers already conduct peacekeeping operations very differently from American troops. They expend less effort on force protection, they fraternise more with locals and they are more reluctant to loose ? re-power. Europeans will also, inevitably, fight their wars differently from the Americans.Given their budgetary constraints, European defence ministries have no choice but to focus less than the Pentagon does on sophisticated technology and airpower, and more on the role of ground forces. But these differences of fury should not prevent the Europeans from defeating most of their prospective enemies. When the EU mounts an autonomous combat operation, it is likely to be against a small or medium-sized power with weak air defences. The Europeans do not plan to ? ght any large and wellequipped adversaries on their own. In such cases, European soldiers would ? ght alongside American troops.Finally, the rapid developing of EU internal security policy will affect defence policy. The March 2004 bombings in Madrid con? rmed the ability of al-Qaeda-style terrorist groups to strike at Europe. In order to track these groups, EU governments will have to piece together information from a variety of sources. They have pledged to stride up intelligence-sharing, and in March 2004 they appointed Gijs de Vries as the Unions ? rst anti-terrorism tsar. Since the terrorist threat comes from both within and removed the EU, the member-states can no longer aff ord to maintain 7 See Daniel Keohane the traditional notation etween external and and Adam Townsend, internal security. 7 In the most extreme cases, EU A joined-up EU security policy, CER countries may wish to deploy force against a Bulletin, December terrorist group that is based abroad, or against a 2003 January 2004. state that harbours terrorists. European defence policy is developing fast and a more distinctive European approach to warfare is bound to emerge in coming years. However, such an approach is paradoxically more likely to develop in NATO than in the EU itself. For most European defence ministries, NATO will continue to be the principal multinational 2 A European way of war military organisation. That is not only because NATO is a military alliance which the EU is not but also because of NATOs large and experienced military headquarters. More than 2,000 people work at NATOs strategic headquarters (Supreme Headquarters assort Powers Europe known as SHAPE) in Mo ns, Belgium, while the EU military staff in Brussels has fewer than 200 people. Moreover, NATO has regional command headquarters in Naples (Italy) and Brunssum (the Netherlands), as well as a fault headquarters in Norfolk (US), which focuses speci? ally on reforming NATOs armies. Put simply, European armies are reforming principally because of their collaboration in NATO, rather than the EU. The best example of this reform process is the NATO Response Force. Britain, France, Spain and Germany are See Kori Schake, leading the European contribution to this force, Constructive duplication reducing EU reliance on US while American participation is only symbolic. military assets, CER, Thus NATO is playing its part in promoting a January 2002. She proposed more ambitious but distinctly European way that the Europeans develop of war.The irony is that the NATO Response a strike force, similar to Force was an American idea, which the the NATO Response Force Europeans have enthusiastically e mbraced. 8 that governments agreed to 8 2 cornerstone the EU develop an effective military doctrine? Lawrence Freedman Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine which would de? ne the procedures to guide armed forces in future con? icts? EU governments have very different military strengths and diverse attitudes towards the use of military force. Those differences mean that the EU would produce a dysfunctional military doctrine, if it tried to create one.However, either acting together or separately, EU armies could make a distinctively European contribution to contemporary military operations. Britain and France should take the lead in de? ning that contribution. Their armed forces are the most capable and experienced in Europe, and have therefore had the opportunity to develop military doctrines that have been tried in the most dangerous types of operation. Any European military effort has to be compared with American military power. The US is in an unassailable mail fo r winning customary wars, as it did in Iraq in the spring of 2003.However, the problem of insurgents in Iraq has illustrated the extent to which the US has a dysfunctional military doctrine for unconventional warfare. Europeans should therefore not be obsessed with matching US military intrepidity. Europes conventional capabilities should be suf? cient to cope with most prospective con? icts, especially since the cases where they might ? ght wars without the Americans would be rare. Unconventional warfare has become the most signi? cant and demanding form of military operation, and in this area the Americans have a lot to learn from the Europeans. et up in November 2002. In the coming years, European governments should strengthen their military clout and conduct more ambitious autonomous military operations. But they should also improve the ability of their soldiers to work alongside Americans. As NATO evolves and reforms, the EUs security and defence policy will reap the bene? ts . Those who see the ESDP and NATO as competing and mutually exclusive concepts and there are a few such people, in some parts of the Pentagon and the French foreign ministry are living in the past.NATO and EU defence policy will sink or swim together, and on current trends they will swim. 14 Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 15 An EU military doctrine would be dysfunctional Countries ofttimestimes develop reputations for conducting their military campaigns in accordance with their national character. On this basis, northern Europeans would be cool and calculating, and southern Europeans romantic and impetuous, while the British would be pragmatic and stubborn. In practice, however, geo-strategic considerations are the biggest in? uence on national military doctrines.A cursory glance at 20th speed of light military campaigns backs up this point. In the 1960s, the Israelis knew they had to seize the initiative against Egypt, Jordan and Syria by striking ? rst if they had waited until they were attacked they would have been swamped. In the 1940s, the Russians could depend on territorial space and population mass to defend against the invading German army, while the Germans wanted to make the most of their qualitative advantages such as their superior equipment before the quantitative disadvantages began to tell.For maritime powers such as Britain and the US, the natural instinct has been to project sea and air power from a distance, and to rely on allies to range out the bulk of land warfare. To be relevant and effective, a military doctrine should draw on a view of the world and its problems make assessments of available military capabilities (including those of allies and enemies) and add minute ideas about strategy and tactics for the armed forces to follow. Thus, a doctrine should provide a framework in which armed forces can train, plan, conduct exercises, and generally work together in a mutually reinforcing way.The best doctrines orientate armed forces for the future, so that soldiers recognise the situations in which they will find themselves and know how to act. A commandants orders should be clear and well understood by his or her soldiers. By the same token, bad doctrine will lead to surprises and disorientation. In the worst circumstances, major(ip) lodgeations to the organisation of the armed forces and the conduct of military operations will be required, even in the midst of a war going badly. A doctrine emanates rom a political process, involving ministries, agencies, and armed services so any doctrinal changes will require dialogue between those disparate groups. Military doctrine, therefore, reflects the preferences of powerful voices within government and the armed forces, as well as the concerns of key allies. One consequence of a complex political process involving a range of competing inte confronts may be a dysfunctional doctrine. The risk of dysfunction grows during a prolonged full poin t of peace, which tends to spare doctrine from critical scrutiny.Only regular experience with combat and the last empirical test of war provide defence ministries with constant reality checks. The risk of a dysfunctional EU doctrine is high, mainly because it would require 25 governments and their respective defence establishments to compromise. If EU governments did agree on a common military doctrine, it would stem from a determination to demonstrate political unity and not from the need for a doctrine that would provide effective guidance in an actual difference of opinion.Furthermore, European governments have not yet developed a very successful EU foreign policy. And such a foreign policy is a precondition for EU success in the military sphere. No European soldiers will be deployed on EU military missions if the Unions governments cannot agree on their political neutrals. The impact of having several governments negotiate strategy documents, whether in the EU or NATO, is t o render those documents more bland and vague. The European Security Strategy, which EU leading approved in December 2003, illustrates that point (see Francois Heisbourgs chapter).Furthermore, these political processes have become even more perplex with the arrival of ten new EU members in May 2004. Both the EU and NATO are comely progressively unwieldy and less able to act swiftly and decisively in a crisis. But NATO has more chance of acting decisively, because of US leadership and the absence of the more paci? st EU neutrals (Austria, Finland, Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Sweden). In addition, most EU member-states have only limited experience of war-? ghting. With the excommunication of France, the enthusiasm in some 16 A European way of warCan the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 17 capitals for the Europeanisation of national armed forces too often appears to be directly related to a deep reluctance to use military force. Belgium is the most conspicuous exam ple of this tendency. Only Britain and France have recently had substantial military experience. Only London and Paris have had to think about the demands of high-octane missions. For example, aside from contributing to various military coalitions, Britain sent troops to Sierra Leone in 2000, while France deployed soldiers on its own to the Ivory Coast in 2002.Other EU member-states have participated in coalition wars or in peacekeeping operations which have sometimes been quite bruising experiences. And many EU governments are fashioning substantial contributions to operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. But a serious military doctrine should not only re? ect combat experience but also command experience. Countries like Germany and Spain are going through and through a useful military reform process, but their national doctrines remain limited compared to those of Britain and France, because they have less experience of commanding larger units of troops.Much contemporar y warfare is against opponents which do not represent a direct experiential threat, as did the Soviet Union, but rather cause chaos in the more fragile parts of the world. There may be a variety of reasons why one EU government might thumb obliged to get involved in a con? ict (such as lingering post-colonial ties), but equally many reasons why others might not. At present, there is no consensus in Europe on the purpose or the circumstances in which it is appropriate to use military force. There is, therefore, a risk that even if the EU had a military doctrine, re? cting the uncomplete views and meagre capabilities of most of its member-states, the governments would not agree on whether to participate in, or on how to conduct future EU operations. For some countries, like France and Austria, an EU brand might legitimise a military doctrine and future operations but for others, such as Denmark and some of the new EU members, it could have the opposite effect. For all these reasons, any attempt to turn the EU into a proper military organisation with a shared doctrine is bound to end in failure.However, a European approach to warfare does not have to be an EU approach. Instead, Europe could develop a way of war that builds on the experience of the major European military powers, namely Britain and France. There is something distinctive about the demanding nature of their past experiences and present contributions which could be a model for the rest of Europe. Furthermore, those European countries that have actively participated in recent operations, such as Spain, Italy, Poland and the Netherlands, also share this distinctive approach, at least to some full stop.Most wars are now fought by coalitions of the willing. International institutions the United Nations, NATO or the EU endow a degree of legitimacy on such coalitions, but do not run major wars themselves. The NATO management of the 1999 Kosovo war may be the exception that proves the rule. The real qu estion is which governments are ready to join a coalition to address a particular emergency. A key aspect of the answer to that question is the likely role that the US would play in leading such coalitions. American military doctrine is dysfunctionalUS military doctrine has become increasingly dysfunctional. The principal reason is the changed nature of modern warfare, rather than the convoluted political process in Washington. European commentators often make the mistake of equivalence de? ciencies in their own decision-making procedures to the complex and often acrimonious inter-agency process in Washington. The delays and confusion that the Washington process can cause are often serious. But there is an important difference with Europe in the US there is a single decision-maker the president who serves as the ? nal arbiter.All US armed services Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines have developed their own doctrines, often with scant regard for each 18 A European way of war Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 19 other. Nevertheless, ever since the US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975, an underlying confidence has given coherence and continuity to American military thinking. The fundamental arrogance guiding the Pentagon is that US armed forces should prepare for wars against other major powers. All other types of operation are secondary ones which America should, if at all possible, avoid. From this assumption ? ws the reason that American doctrine has become dysfunctional unambiguous conventional wars against major powers are becoming a rarity, while complicated small wars are becoming more common. There are two specific reasons behind the failure of existing American doctrine. First, the energy and resources which the Pentagon devotes to conventional forces have reached a point of diminishing marginal returns. Second, the Pentagon has washed-out too little effort on training soldiers for those unconventional operations that it laid-off as non-core business, but which are increasingly dominating Americas military efforts.The recent US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated that ? ? ? with increasing accuracy. This means that the interlock of overseas bases which the US established in Europe during the Cold War is becoming redundant. As a consequence, allies are often considered to be something of a nuisance, demanding major political inputs in return for minor military outputs. Donald 9 US Department of Defense Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defense, has newsworthiness Brie? ng in Warsaw with observed that in the current era the mission Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, September 25th 2002. hould determine the coalition, rather than the other way around. 9 NATOs Kosovo war did much to manufacture Americas attitudes towards its allies. NATO tried to achieve its objectives through an air campaign, which led to an exaggerated comprehension of the disparity between American and European military capabilit ies. Europeans could barely muster 15 per cent of the total air sorties. But to the intense irritation of the Americans, this gap did not stop the Europeans from demanding a big say over the selection of targets and the overall course of the war. The largest transatlantic row occurred when the British overnment pushed for a commitment to use ground troops if the air campaign continued to fail to produce results. The Clinton administration was deeply reluctant to pay a domestic political price for such a land campaign. It feared that US public opinion would be unwilling to earmark even modest casualties for what would be seen as marginal foreign policy objectives. Only Britains promise to commit up to 50,000 troops to an eventual(prenominal) land operation began to ease US objections. conventional victories are relatively easy to accomplish the West can easily achieve air dominance and the key military tests are increasingly found on the ground.In terms of conventional warfare, the US is now in a family unit of its own. This is hardly surprising since the US defence budget is equivalent to what the rest of the world spends collectively on defence. America also spends its defence money far more ef? ciently than European governments do. Even so, to occupy a country the size of Iraq with effectively only three combat divisions (each with between 10,000 and 18,000 soldiers), as the US did in April 2003, is remarkable. Furthermore, recent advances in defence technology have allowed American commanders to project lethal power over great distances EU defence too much process, not enough outputTransatlantic arguments over the Kosovo campaign had a major impact on European attitudes towards a common defence policy. By the end of the 1992-95 Bosnian war, European leaders were bear on about the United States limited commitment to resolving European con? icts. On the eve of the Kosovo war, in December 1998, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac held a summit at St Malo. They identi? ed a way 20 A European way of war Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 21 See Gilles Andreani, Christoph Bertram and Charles Grant, Europes military revolution, CER, 2001. 10 orward for European defence and the Kosovo war initially accelerated that process. 10 However, FrancoBritish momentum was soon lost, and resultant events in particular the quarrels over Iraq have highlighted once again the differences of view between Paris and London. The core issue in Europes defence debates is what relationship Europe should have with the US. To simplify somewhat but not excessively the French believe Europe must mounting its military game to provide a counterweight to the US. The main objective for the British is to be taken seriously in Washington and get a hearing for European views.In their respective approaches, the British have been more consistent. If there has been a British approach to warfare for the past 60 years, it has been to gear military capabilities to the level that is obligatory to gain an entree into Washingtons decisionmaking processes. France, however, has fluctuated between its readiness to embrace an alliance with the US and its rely to develop substitute(a)s. The problem for the French is that they cannot balance American power on their own, so they need to propose a mission for Europe as a whole.The French have often tried to get other European countries to sign up to this kind of project. But the countries that are inclined to support France do not possess substantial military assets and experience. This strategy looks forlorn unless Britain, Europes only other serious military power, collaborates with France. For both the French and the British, the improvement of European military capabilities is a necessary condition for further progress either to convince the Americans that their European allies can bring some hardware to the decision-making table, or else to set the fo undations for an alternative to NATO.The St Malo compromise also shows the limits of both the British and French positions. Blair agreed that the Europeans should be able to act without the Americans in contingencies involving neighbourhood crises although he assumed that the US would agree that the EU could use NATO assets. In return, Chirac accepted that the EU could not credibly expect to duplicate NATOs proviso and command capabilities. The Iraq row has not been fatal to the European defence initiative. A more serious problem for the EU is that its defence policy will lack heart without extra military capabilities and these have yet to materialise.European countries cannot move 11 vii European substantial forces with speed to anywhere governments are buying outside Europe. Only Britain has any serious, if 180 A-400M transport modest, transport capability while Germany planes but these are short had to use Ukrainian aircraft to carry its troops range rather than long range. Only the UK has to Afghanistan. Some improvements are in long range transport planes train, albeit painfully slowly. For example, the that can carry the ? rst of the A400M transport planes should be heaviest loads. delivered in 2009. 1 These limitations do not make Europe-only operations impossible. But EU missions are either going to be small, and in effect Britishled and/or French-led, or the Europeans will have to rely upon American support, as they do in the Balkans. At the moment, EU defence policy gives the impression of being yet another European initiative bogged down in endless and largely pointless wrangles about process. To sceptics, the defence debates in Brussels have little to do with preparing for warfare, and more to do with recuperative a ? agging European political project.This explains why the key innovations in EU defence policy tend to be about setting up new institutions in Brussels, rather than defence ministries buying new equipment. This general preoccupat ion in European capitals with form rather than content was apparent(a) in the debate over planning cells in 2003. In April of that year, France and Germany (together with Belgium and Luxembourg) proposed a European planning cell that would operate separately from NATOs command structures to the intense annoyance of Europes Atlanticist countries such as Britain. 22 A European way of warCan the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 23 In December 2003, EU governments agreed that the EU would deploy a small group of in operation(p) planners to SHAPE, NATOs planning headquarters near Mons. This group will work on ensuring a smooth relationship between the EU and NATO on Berlin-plus missions, when the EU borrows NATO assets. There will also be a new unit of about 30 operational planners for the EUs military staff, which currently consists mainly of strategic planners (their job is to advise EU foreign ministers on the operational plans that may come out of SHAPE or a national mil itary headquarters).The new unit will help with the planning of EU military and civilian missions which involve policemen. Given that there are very few places where Europeans could even think of acting militarily without a kind US attitude, and probably American logistical and intelligence support, the point of the Franco-German purpose was unclear. The fact that such proposals irritate Washington may be a bonus for some in Paris and Berlin, but it also strengthens the perception that the purpose of European defence policy has little to do with how armed forces might actually be used. articipated in operations abroad. Germany is an interesting example of this reform process. At the end of 2003 the German government decided to open frame the focus of its defence planning from territorial defence towards acting overseas. By 2010 Germany will have a 35,000-strong intervention force for combat operations and a 70,000-strong stabilisation force for peacekeeping. To pay for this, the Germans are sensibly getting rid of large stocks of weapons designed for con? icts that are now unlikely to materialise.There is little point in any European country maintaining large numbers of aircraft that can deliver only dumb bombs. The question of how European armies should work with American forces is crucial for the development of a European approach to warfare. But the terms of the Europeans defence debate need to change. In particular they need to get away from taking American military prowess as the standard by which all others are judged. There are three reasons for this. First, there are very few contingencies in which the Europeans could conjecture ? hting a major war without the US. The most serious military scenarios would be in Asia such as a future con? ict involving China. In these circumstances, it is inconceivable that European governments would act independently of the US. Moreover, when the Europeans did work with the Americans in a conventional war, the added value would be largely political rather than military. Second, comparing European military power with the US is both misleading and irrelevant. The massive American defence effort sets an impossible standard for Europeans to meet.European governments should not try to match the extravagant US force structure. Nevertheless, Europeans do need to attain their past promises to improve military capabilities, so that they they are not caught short in some future emergency. Crucially, this does not require a large additional financial commitment from European governments. The way forward for European defence Any attempt by governments to draw up an EU military doctrine would be fraught and probably futile. Instead, Britain and France should lead Europe in developing a European approach to warfare that is based on their recent campaigns.Other European states would have to be involved in that process, and be prepared to contribute. In many respects, British and French doctrine is alr eady quite mature and well geared for contemporary international conditions, especially when the task involves irregular war in weak or failing states. The British operation in Sierra Leone in 2000 and the French mission to the Ivory Coast in 2002 are examples of the types of operation which the EU can expect to undertake in the near future. Furthermore, British and French doctrine has already had a significant influence on those other EU countries that have 4 A European way of war Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 25 Furthermore, there is not going to be a transatlantic war, and the Europeans and Americans need to be able to work together. The surge in American military technology does create new problems for Europeans move to work alongside American soldiers on the ground. However, European governments should aim to develop armies that complement the US armed forces rather than copy them. Europeans will only act alone in those contingencies where the Americans do not see much of a role for themselves.Europeans cannot work directly against the Americans, or even take action in the face of deep American objections though the Americans can act against European objections. Unless a well-armed rogue state emerges near Europe, such as a nuclear-armed Iran, the most likely opponents of the EU will be in Africa or the Middle East and will have weak air defences. Such opponents would not be a serious match for European forces, especially if the Americans were assisting with logistics and intelligence. It is true that the Europeans could not have fought the Kosovo war without the US, at least not in the way the Americans fought it.But European governments could have fought that war differently, with a greater stress from the start on preparations for a land war. A modest number of high quality aircraft, especially in combination with welltrained professional forces, can be extremely effective. For example, during the 1980s the Iranians spent six yea rs outside Basra, unable to make headway against the Iraqi defences. In 2003, the British spent about eight days in that position. The conclusion is clear Europeans do not have to ? ght as Americans. Even if they wanted to, it would be altogether beyond their capabilities.But more importantly, in many contemporary con? icts they are better off ? ghting the European way. The third reason for not trying to copy the US is the dysfunctional nature of American military doctrine. present-day(a) American doctrine focuses on big threats and prepares US armed forces for capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive wars. But the conventional war stage of a conflict is shrinking, while the unconventional war stage which follows is expanding. Examples of this phenomenon are high-intensity policing in the Balkans, peacekeeping in Afghanistan, and the counter-insurgency operations in Iraq.Impressive US strides in conventional warfare are due to American cultural impatience a political prefere nce for quick results and technology-based solutions and the Pentagons desire to use maximum resources to keep casualties to a minimum. Irregular warfare requires more patience and puts greater pressures on frontline troops and junior of? cers. Soldiers also have to co-ordinate their efforts with aid workers and diplomats, as well as quell social unrest. In these cases, the enemy understands that it will be overwhelmed in regular war. But, with a determination ? ed by nationalism, ethnic vulnerability or ideology, the enemy can embarrass the Americans by adopting traditional insurgent tactics. Iraq is a particularly challenging example, for very speci? c historical reasons. The Iraq experience is posing the biggest test to American military prowess since Vietnam although it is not of the same proportions. The Americans have suffered heavily from a ? xation with force protection, which often leads to over-reaction by soldiers that pushes insurgents and locals together. A comparison between the American counter-insurgency operation in Baghdad and the British one in Basra in 2003-04 ? tters the British, because of the much more favourable political climate in southern Iraq. Nonetheless, it reinforces the view that the British have a better approach to this sort of campaign, in particular by understanding the importance of separating the insurgents and the local population. It is fair to say that Europeans are more skilled at this sort of campaign, in part because of the tradition of imperial policing, but also because of their more recent and extensive experience of peacekeeping. Because todays opponents are more likely to specialise in guerrilla warfare than tanks and aircraft, there is now a paradoxical situation. 6 A European way of war The United States reluctance to engage in unconventional wars has constrained its surplus of power. Both the Clinton and, initially, the Bush administrations desire to dampen expectations that the US would be willing and able to sort out every local con? ict. They were especially fearful of being wasted into a series of inconclusive and domestically unpopular foreign entanglements. But the events of September 11th 2001 created new imperatives for American activism. Washington now has major commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, and is ? nding it harder to limit those commitments.The days when the Pentagon could insist that it would not enter a con? ict without a clear exit strategy, and then pass on the thankless and demanding task of nation-building to others, have passed. This is already starting to have important consequences for doctrine development in the US. The Iraq experience shows that a new con? ict sequence is developing in which the length of the actual war is contracting, because there are few likely enemies able to withstand intense and precise ? repower. But the post-war activity, which can be both tough and deadly, may misdirect out almost inde? itely. The key question is not whether the Europeans can adapt to American doctrine, but whether the Americans can adapt to the European way of war. 3 The European Security Strategy is not a security strategy Francois Heisbourg At the Brussels summit in December 2003, European Union governments adopted a document entitled A secure Europe in a better world and subtitled European Security Strategy (hereafter referred to as the ESS). 12 In the spring of 2003, the governments had given the EUs High Representative for foreign policy, Javier Solana, a mandate to draw up this document.

Privacy and Computer Technology Essay

Privacy is a valuable interest and is straight off threatened more than ever by technological advances. Privacy is delineate as the major power to control the collection, use, and dissemination of personal development (Fast Trac ground level ). At one time people could once feel positive(p) that what others whitethorn baring bulge around them would be treated in a stylus that it would probably do each harm. Information applied science has been beneficial for seclusion. By having access to ATMs and online banking we r arly tolerate to present ourselves to a teller. Online bring outping offers similar benefits such as creation able to shop without standing in long lines and being able to comp be prices and query products in the beginning purchasing. However, since so much of what we do daily is hold oute use a computing device, it commode pose a serious threat to solitude.This entropy can then be recreated to create detailed personal profiles that could not c ountenance transpired in pre-digital days. Furthermore, this randomness can be distri provideded far, wide, and immediately without our hold or even knowledge. Judicial remedies are unlikely to produce a satisfying or sensible balance between companies economic prerogatives and customers screen interest. New technologies that has either unconsiously adopted or resourcefully applied cover pr work outices will continue to threaten personal privacy. Business will have to arrest ways to address this uneasiness. If companies remain complacent, underestimating the degree to which privacy matters to customers, caustic regulation may be waiting in the wings. The best way out is for businesses and customers to negotiate directly over where to draw the lines. (What is Privacy?) there are many databases and Internet eternises that track or keep record of randomness about an privates financial and course credit history, health check record, purchases and telephone calls. Most peop le do not know what selective tuition is stored about them or who has access to it. The ability for others to access and link the databases, with a couple of(prenominal) controls on how they use, share, or exploit the study, makes individual control over information about oneself more difficult than ever before. For example, the caller Id was originally intentional to allow you to screen your calls and protect from receiving unwanted calls from harassers, telemarketers, etc In turn it snarled privacy concerns for both the caller and the person called. Over the years, there has been a clash between privacy and advancing technologies, which can make a compelling argument for overriding the privacy intrusions.The challenge of improving certificate while protecting privacy is called existent Id. The real ID act provides noteworthy challenges. It was signed into law on May 11, 2005 (public law 109-13). After may 11, 2008 A national agency may not accept, for any formalised purp ose, a dirvers license or identification notice issued by a convey to any persin unless the state is meeting the requirements. The real ID act defines what information and features must appear on the card, what documentation must be presented before a card can be issued, what verification the state must do before a card can be issued, and gage mea veritables to prevent tampering counterfeiting and duplication of the card. The Real Id requires states to confirm the identities and documentation of applicants, defy come one woods licence and ID cards extremely difficult to counterfiet, and to as genuine one driver one record so that you will be able to give only one licence which only go for people that has mutliple addresses .The Real Id symbolise is really the outgrowth of the 911 commision reccomended that the licence be improved and it should be a national standard. Represenative James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis) who was the cahir of the house judiciary committee utter American citizens have the right to know who is in their country, that people are who they say they are , and the gain on a drivers licence is the carriers real name, not som alias. Historically the licence has been a state function so the act tailors the mandate that you must present this identification.The challlenges comes from the act because the real ID act was written by Congress without expressing privacy protections. slightly of the privacy challenges are what information should be stored in the machine readanble bug outition off?, who should have access to the information stored in the machine readable regularise?, and what information, if any will be centralized in order to alleviate the necessary data exchange among the state?. I feel that there should be some limitations on the information stored in the readable partition and the data systems protect the personal information from unauthorized uses and disclosure.Information about individuals is used by businesses to prov ide customers with a huge array of targeted fulls and personalise services that consumers have come to watch. If it lands in the wrong hands, this same information can result in harm to the genuinely individuals it was meant to serve. The protection of an individuals personal information has business implications that extend beyond the privacy of any one individual. Private information relative to certain businesses and industries is protect by various laws. For example the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) laws protect private medical information. Many states have enacted their own laws, and the national government is regulated by the Privacy Act of 1974. Legislatures are progressively responding to calls for greater protection of private information, and stories of improper disclosures of large volumes of private information receive prominent media attention.At present, there is no broad, general federal law protecting the privacy of customer infor mation most protections are aimed at particular types of information (such as medical or schoolchild records,) or particular types of businesses (such as medical providers, banks, and financial service businesses). Customers and consumers expect their information to be protected and businesses that recognize the necessity to make privacy part of their business strategy are ahead of the game. Many companies have gone to great lengths to protect information using technological advances. However, the ability of a business to protect private information it collects as part of its business is only as strong as its weakest link the gay factor something that technology but cant overcome. Having knowledge of privacy and credential should be aimed at individuals who work with private information to financial aid actualize the ways that this information can be disclosed inadvertently.We are now moving into an era where there will always be a digital observer. Unlike footprints left in the sand, our online data trails oft stick around long after the tide has gone out and they are growing rapidly. Digital footprints are trails of information left by a persons interaction in the digital environs (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_footprint). They existed since day one or even before you were born. Internet users dont realize that e genuinely time they use the network they leave digital footprints.This includes massive amounts of data in the form of netmail, documents, images, games, music, apps, movies, login and logouts, visits to a web-page, accessed or created files, chat messages or any other material showing the activities being done on a website. What people dont understand is when you try to reduce your digital footprint you actually make it larger. When trying to reduce your digital footprints interested parties can still use data they have found for evidence, data mining or profiling purposes. This doesnt mean that you cant try to protect yourself but you should way out precautions when accessing or posting personal information on websites. People need to be proactive and take control of their digital footprint.Due to accession utilization of kindly media, we should have a heighted alive(predicate)ness of privacy. Being aware of what personally identifiable information that is included in your online profile is very important. Publicy exposed private information on the web can alike be used to steal your idenity and money. With more employers using the internet to find out about their current or potential modernistic employees, it is good to know in advance what information is floating around the internet about you. You should only put PII in your profile that you wouldnt approximation the entire world including potential or current employers to view. For example, you can find this out by searching for yourself in Google to see what comes up. Also, be awake of strangers. People can misrepresent themselves and their motives s o when posting on any social media website it is good to limit who is allowed to contact you and what you tell strangers with whom you communicate with (U.S. segment of State Privacy Tips).Privacy is so important not just to my online presence but also to my financial documents. Financial privacy is a another term for a multitude of privacy issues, ranging from financial institutions ensuring that their customers information remain private to those outside the institution as well as individuals ensuring that they are protecting their privacy in the privacy of their homes. These documents can be protected by guarding your social security topic, calling carefully, and cleaning your name off call lists. Unless you are paying your income taxes, you shouldnt place your social security number on checks and dont keep your number in your wallet. A stolen or lost wallet with your social security number can make it easy for mortal to obtain new credit in your name. An 800 number is a conve nient cost saver, but not if the company you call isnt reputable. Your call can be the electronic source for undesirable solicitation lists or cause dissimulator by giving out your credit card number to someone who misuses it.You can ask companies you buy from not to release your name to others. You can also have your name eliminated from mass mailing lists by writing to the Direct Marketing Association. Protecting your financial privacy is something that shouldnt be taken lightly. The fair credit reporting act guarantees access to your credit report for free. If you at anytime feel your credit has been compromised you should visit the Federal condescension Commissions website. (How to Deal with a credentials Breach) In summary, in that respect are many threats to privacy but there are ways you can prevent compromise by criminals and by privacy invade infestations. There are many things you can do to increase to increase your privacy especially online. Protecting your privacy online requires keeping your computer galosh from many types of online dangers. Some of the ways to prevent online dangers are making sure the sites you vist is safe beofre sharing personal information.This incluses your real name, email address, credit card number, etc.The next way is to make sure your online account is properly tack for ideal privacy protection. This includes making sure to use a give-and-take that are hard to break. The next way is to protect wireless connectedness from dangers or intrusions. When connecting to the internet via a wireless connection make sure that you re suing a protected password. The next way is to remove yourself from search databases. This can be done by sending a email through a reputable website such as private eye, 123people.com, or intelius.com. Another way is by increasing the privacy of your browser. This a very important part of protecting your online privacy but it also secures your computer against malware and other threats. Last ly, use a temporary credit card number that is linked to your financial account but is only valid for private or limited transactions.Bibliography(Wikipedia, pg 1)en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_footprintFast Trac CourseHow to Deal with a Security BreachThe Three Basic Forms of Business OwnershipWhat is Privacy?

A Woman’s Place Is In the Home Essay

The saying A Womans Place Is In the property seems extremely provokative to me. I refuse to accept this idea. I strongly confide that a adult femalehood should develop some professional skills and have a job. Anyway, the question to work or not to work is quite more raised in many families because the issue is not so clear. In my presentation Id like to dwell on the advantages and disadvantages of the shoes in which a womanhood has to combine family and career. I will arrest with the drawbacks the family whitethorn suffer from. Ive singled out 5 of them. 1. Its precise hard sometimes to juggle family and career. A woman experiences lack of throw in the towel time, lack of sleep which may lead to stress and problems with health. 2. A woman may start paying less attention to her save and her children.As a consequence, they may get dissapointed, they may even feel that their wife and m otherwise doesnt love them any more than. 3. Because of stress a woman may start pourin g exclusively her worries to her spouse thus abominable him. It may result in divorse. 4. A woman may drop off into herself and her career thus provoking the possibility of adultery on her husbands part who may seek endearment elsewhere. 5. In case a womans career is more successful than that of her spouse it may put a strain on the marriage. Some men plainly cant put up with the fact that their wife earns more than they do. Now I will pass to the benefits which the family may have if a woman works. Ill mebtion 10 of them. 1. Financial aspect more income.2. A womans self-esteem and fulfillment are developed.  3. Communication with other people beyond the family circle meets social needs of a human being being. 4. Family relationships become more balanced, a husband respects his wife, doesnt revile her. Equality. 5. A woman feels more affection and love for her family because she misses them. 6. Children become more independent with an internalized sense of responsibility. 7. A woman becomes break in groomed and better dressed thus feels happier. 8. Social benefits (insurance policy, social security).9. Financial independence. A woman becomes a productive and contributing member of the family. 10. A job generates self-discilpline, sets vagabond in life and makes a woman a perfect time-manager. Summing it all up Id like to say that Im absolutely convinced that the benefits mentioned above prevail all the disadvantages. It worths taking risks and truing at least. In my opinion a womans place is not only in the home because a woman is a much more talanted and gifted creature than many men believe.

Identify the Different Reasons People Communicate

I am of the opinion that as a child practitioner an essential part of our study role go out involve actively seeking to evolve and where apt build relationships. so having a signifi dirty dogt impact on children and young bulks lives. As quoted, (Children and young peoples workforce, early and child c atomic number 18 book 2010) there are a number of reasons why people communicate which are toBuild relationshipsThe ability to effectively communicate with a wide post of people is a vital factor in work towards build relationships that may flourish and enable the gaining of boldness and trust.For example in functional with some young children who may have difficulty expressing themselves, an array of emotions could be displayed, i. e. Frustration, aggression, anxiety and withdrawal. As a practitioner, it would therefore be authoritative to be patient, approachable, non judgmental and a good listener. It is also good to be fictive in terms of engagement recognising the differ ent needs of young people.Maintaining relationshipsI am of a view that open converse and a positive billet stand support the maintenance of relationships.I feel it is therefore fundamental to assess your own attitudes and values to ensure this doesnt impact on others, hence have a willingness to challenge any arising issues in a professional manner. Conflict may arise in a workingss relationship. It would be important to be sensitive and allow feelings to be aired, exactly actively seek where apt to resolve a situation kind of of dwelling on the issue.Gain and share infoWorking in partnership with young people, families, work colleagues and professional bodies is the foundation for enabling effective service delivery. The gaining and sharing of information where appropriate enables the identification of need and appropriate support. I. e. Child protection issue, discussed on a need to know basis, the aim universe to protect the natural rubber and well organism of the chi ld.Gain reassurance and acknowledgementIt is important to have an awareness of others and the different slipway you can provide support. I. e. praising a child or your colleague, being a listening ear, giving constructive feedback and being approachable. This stance can elevate confidence and vision. Express needs and feelings It is important for young people and colleagues feel that they can express their needs and feelings without being judged or discriminated against. thence I feel it is important for a practitioner where appropriate to dictate aside their personal judgements to facilitate others and provide them with an opportunity to be perceive and supported. For example this stance can allow others to find their voice and brace self esteem.Share ideas and thoughtsI am of an opinion that sharing ideas and thoughts is an essential part of communication.It can foster a better intellectual of each other and issues promoting respect, confidence and new approaches. In working in a team or with young people it can enable the forming of new relationships creating better working practices and pro change and more productive outcomes.1. 2 Explain how communication affects relationships in the work setting In order for communication to be effective within a work setting it is essential to pitch and sustain good relationships with a diverse range of people and agencies. in spite of appearance a work setting, poor communication can lead to a number of factors, i. . low moral, mistrust, anger, anxiety and isolation.If communication issues are not persistent outcomes can be absences, high staff turnover, and ineffective service delivery, which impacts on the service users. It is imperative to keep the lines of communication open to build plastered relations. Awareness of your body language, tone of voice, proximity, cultural differences, individual needs and being non judgmental can foster good relationships. Accordingly in working with colleagues regular supe rvision/team meetings and training can promote understanding and better work ethics.In working with children and young people it is important to be able to engage with them (as outlined in unit 1. 2). During the remittal in and transitioning period great consideration needs to be given up to identify any barriers to communication and plan appropriate support for themselves and parents. I. e. blusher working, ESOL identifying any internal or external resources that may be applicable. I am of the belief that taking such steps to improve working practices can make children, young people and their parents feel that they have been hear and supported.