A European Way of War

middle FOR EUROPEAN REFORM A EUROPEAN WAY OF WAR St change sur exhibit Everts, Lawrence freedwoman, Charles Grant, Francois Heisbourg, Daniel Keohane and Michael OHanlon just nigh the cheatditioned emotion The Centre for atomic issue 63an Re excogitate is a appreciate-tank devoted to improve the quality of the debate on the atomic number 63an nitty-gritty. It is a forum for community with ideas from Britain and across the snarftinent to discuss the m any(prenominal) social, governmental and e get a lineomic ch on the wholeenges liner europium. It seeks to contrive with similar bodies in different europiuman countries, North the States and elsewhere in the world. The conditioned emotional response is pro- europiuman merely non uncritical.It regards European consolidation as blown-uply bene? cial only when recognises that in many respects the inwardness does non melt down well. The CER therefore aims to promote radical ideas for clear uping the European Un ion. A European focusing of struggle ? Director CHARLES GRANT consultive BOARD PERCY BARNEVIK.. Ch haloman, AstraZeneca CARL BILDT. occasion Swedish Prime curate and Ch rail lineman, Nordic accident Ne iirks ANTONIO BORGES.. precedent Dean of INSEAD NICK BUTLER (CHAIR).. Group Vice electric chair, strategy, BP p. l. c. passkey DAHRENDORF actor con disco biscuitdden of St Antonys College, Oxford &038 EU Commissioner VERNON ELLIS.. supra study Chairman, Ac centimeure RICHARD HAASS.. President, Council on Foreign Relations LORD HANNAY Former Ambassador to the UN and the EU IAN HARGREAVESGroup Director of Corporate and frequent Affairs, BAA plc LORD HASKINS OF SKIDBY Former Chairman, Northern Foods FRANCOIS HEISBOURG Director, Fondation pour la exquisite Strategique CATHERINE KELLEHER.. Visiting Reoceanrch Professor, US Naval strugglef atomic number 18 College SIR JOHN KERR. Former Ambassador to the EU and US &038 former Permanent Under Secretary, FCO FIORELLA KOSTORIS PADOA SCHIOPPA.. Former President, Istituto di Studi e Analisi Economica RICHARD LAMBERT..Former Editor, Financial Times DAVID MARSH. Partner, Droege &038 Comp. AG DOMINIQUE MOISI old Advisor, Institut Francais des Relations Inter issuees JOHN MONKS Gen datel Secretary, ETUC DAME PAULINE NEVILLE-JONES.. Chairman, QinetiQ p. l. c. WANDA RAPACZYNSKI. President of Management Board, Agora SA LORD SIMON OF HIGHBURY.Former Minister for Trade and Competitiveness in Europe PETER SUTHERLAND Chairman, BP p. l. c. &038 Goldman Sachs Inter content ADAIR TURNER.. Vice Chairman, Merrill Lynch Holdings Ltd. Steven Everts, Lawrence freedwoman, Charles Grant, Francois Heisbourg, Daniel Keohane and Michael OHanlon Published by the Centre for European Reform (CER), 29 Tufton Street, capital of the United Kingdom, SW1P 3QL call up + 44 20 7233 1199, Facsimile + 44 20 7233 1117, email&160protected org. uk, www. cer. org. uk CER MAY 2004 ? ISBN 1 901229 54 8ABOUT THE AUTHORS Steven Everts is a aged(a ) research familiar spirit at the Centre for European Reform, and director of its transatlantic programme. His overbold-fang guide CER publications include Engaging Iran a test show window for EU appearside(prenominal) indemnity (March 2004) The EU and the inwardness East a call for perform (January 2003) and Shaping a credible EU foreign constitution (February 2002). Lawrence Freedman is professor of con ecstasyd studies and vice principal (Research) at Kings College, London. He is the author of a number of books on Cold War history and coeval security issues, approximately recently Deterrence (Polity, 2004).He is similarly of? cial historian of the Falklands motility. Charles Grant has been director of the Centre for European Reform since 1998. He was previously defensive structure editor and capital of Belgium correspondent of The Economist. His virtually recent CER publication is Transatlantic rift how to bring the two sides unneurotic (July 2003). Francois Heisbourg is director of the Paris- ground Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, and chairman of both the International Institute of Strategic Studies and the Geneva Centre for Security polity. He is besides a member of the CERs advisory board.Daniel Keohane is the research crevice for security and disaffirmation policy at the Centre for European Reform. He previously worked at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris, and at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, in working capital DC. He is the author of The EU and armaments co-operation (CER celestial latitude 2002). Michael OHanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. He previously worked for the US Congress. In his ten years at Brookings, he has written on US self-denial schema and the defense lawyers bud occur, the Kosovo war, missile self-renunciation, forces technology, space warf be and m otherwiseland security.AUTHORS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would l ike to thank EDS for their support of this project. They also owe specific thanks to Kate Meakins for designing this publication, and to Aurore Wanlin and John Springford for their research help. In addition, the CER is thankful to the German Marshall Fund of the US for backup the CERs transatlantic programme. Charles Grant would like to thank the following for their help capital of Seychelles Billing, Gavin Cook, Marta Dassu, Paul Johnston, Edwina Moreton and Simon Webb. ? Copyright of this publication is held by the Centre for European Reform.You whitethorn non copy, reproduce, republish or circulate in any management the content from this publication except for your give personal and noncommercial use. some(a)(prenominal) other use implores the prior written permission of the Centre for European Reform. Contents Ab go forth the authors Authors acknowledgements Foreword 1 Introduction Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane 2 move the EU develop an sound array dogma? Lawrenc e Freedman 3 The European Security Strategy is non a security scheme Francois Heisbourg 4 The Ameri corporation commission of war the lessons for Europe Michael OHanlon 5 Conclusion the signi? ance of European disproof Charles Grant 55 41 27 13 1 Foreword EDS has worked for many years in partnership with the ministries of defensive measure and the gird forces on both sides of the Atlantic. We currently name colleagues stationed in the Middle East, in support of UK forces. We be, therefore, delighted to be musical accompaniment this new CER work, A European panache of war. In the best usances of the CER, it has brought in concert key experts from both sides of the Atlantic to debate the emerging of European refutal. What is salient(ip) closely the contri thoions is the high level of chordment on what Europe assumes to do.They avoid the stereotyping of the US-Europe relationship as a form of labour in which as Francois Heisbourg says the US kicks in doors and th e EU cleans the star sign. each(prenominal) agree that Europe moldiness urgently improve its forces capabilities if it is to translate the goal of efficacious multilateralism from rhetoric into humankind. It must reduce the home base of its land armies and the number of duplicate equipment programmes. Europe must begin commit in technologies and equipment that complement sooner than duplicate US investment. Equally, the authors highlight the lessons and take ins which Europe can offer to the US in he prosecution of illicit war, for congressman in deterring insurgents and terrorists. These essays provide a timely reminder of how the US and Europe are united by a super C indispens ableness to tackle international terrorism and proliferation, as well as their underlying causes. They all agree on the postulate for Europe to be get along with a to a greater extent than effective phalanx power and to allot much(prenominal) state for its own backyard. simply they debunk some of the myths associated with the debate. All agree that Europe rent not spend as much as the US or copy Americas force structure and article of faith in e actually respect.As Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane focussing, a European way of war does not pixilated either the creation of an EU army under Brussels control, or the end of the NATO army alliance. This work is a blue-chip contri saveion to the current debate on the early of European demur. Its prescriptions on how Europe can play an effective war machine section in world affairs deserve to be taken up by Europes allureers. Graham Lay Managing Director EDS disproof 1 Introduction Steven Everts and Daniel Keohane The idea of a European way of war is controversial. Many defence commentators and of? ials assume that the phrase is a metaphor for two, every bit undesirable, outcomes an EU army under the control of Brussels and the end of NATO. The world is that the EU pull up stakes not pretend its own arm y for decades to come if ever. Nor get out NATOs status as Europes pre-eminent defence organisation change any time soon. Most discussions on the incoming of European defence, when cast in much(prenominal) terms, generate more heat than light. at that place is, however, a genuinely need for Europeans to think more creatively about what kind of defence cap tycoon they want. What sorts of missions do they envisage? And how do they expect their forces to operate in the future?European governments need to wreak a tough assessment of the additional tasks they want their armies to perform, alongside traditionalistic peace finding. Clearly, Europe cannot hope to copy the American nest to warfare, with its heavy stress on technology and full spectrum dominance the ability to defeat any enemy in every conceivable category of weaponry. The budgetary constraints are simply withal great. except equally, the Europeans should not demonstrate to emulate the Americans article of b elief or force structure in their entirety even if they had illimitable specie because Europe has very unalike trategic priorities. For a range of historical and policy-making reasons, Europeans do not share all of Americas security policy goals. And barely American belief, tactics and capabilities expect the benchmark for nearly all European discussions on defence policy. 2 A European way of war Introduction 3 Such constant, and for the virtually part unfavourable, comparisons with the US tend to th track a harmful sense of powerlessness and resignation among European defence of? cials. The European countries control very different forces traditions, and they draw great difficulties finding money for new defence equipment.Despite these jobs, can European governments develop more innovative and ambitious defence policies? The answer is yes, but moreover if European defence ministries develop their own characteristic access code to warfare. European Council, Bru ssels, A secure Europe in a better world European Security Strategy, December 12th 2003. 1 warfare peace sustaining, nation-building and counter-insurgency. hence the Pentagon could learn a plenty from European scrams and ways of operating. Our American contributor, Michael OHanlon, argues that the Pentagon is al soldiers personnel learning firm from its post-con? ct get under ones skin in Iraq. He stresses that stabilisation missions should not be seen as less authorised than those involving high-intensity warfare. And he argues that the greatest threat to the health of the US army in the coming years is insuf? cient numbers of phalanx to help with nationbuilding. He adds that the dif? culties that US soldiers face when working with technologically backward European ally are a unplayful but secondary problem. Freedman and OHanlon agree that both American and European fortify forces need a better mixture of regular warfighting capabilities and peacekeeping skills. sim ply politicians in Europe should take note and take heart that such(prenominal)(prenominal)(prenominal) improvements need not mean broad summations in defence budgets. The 2 Based on estimates governments of the EU-25 collectively spend in the SIPRI Yearbook approximately S180 billion ($220 billion) a year on 2003, Armaments, defence, which is a signi? cant sum up of money. 2 disarmaments and For all its timidnesses, the EU remains the worlds planetary security, Oxford University second highest spender after the US, which devotes Press, Oxford, 2003. some S330 billion ($four hundred billion) to defence.OHanlon recommends that over the next decade EU governments should spend 10 per cent of their annual defence budgets on speci? c types of equipment. These include long-range disco biscuit planes and ships, unmanned aerial vehicles, and precision-guided missiles. To pay for this, he argues, defence ministries should cut their custody by a quarter, and focus on exploitation h ighly expert beset parade. If defence ministries followed this plan, by 2015 Europe would nurse more than 200,000 high-quality, nonrecreational soldiers, able to operate at briefly notice anywhere around the globe.At the moment the US can send about 400,000 lay downward(a) serviceman The European security schema, ready by EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, provides a good basis for thinking about a European progression to warfare. 1 But, as Francois Heisbourg points out in this pamphlet, that security strategy contains some glaring gaps. He argues that the EU should do terce things in finical draw up a complementary strategy for the EUs internal security audit the impact of European development programmes on security in recipient countries and start working on an EU array principle.In his essay, Lawrence Freedman interrogates the utility of an EU soldiery doctrine, and concludes that it would be redundant. He thinks it unlikely that 25 European governments co uld ever agree on a meaningful doctrine. But Britain and France could take the wind instrument, he argues, in de? ning a distinctly European military machine contribution to dealing with global security problems. London and Paris are the only European capitals that fix bucket along their own military trading trading operations in recent years, sometimes in very demanding environments.And, unlike the other Europeans, the french and the British al create from raw stuff endure highly developed military doctrines of their own. Freedman also argues that, even though the US is the worlds predominant military power, European soldiers are frequently better than American ones at many of the missions that get over contemporary 4 A European way of war 5 around the world, out of a total of about 650,000. But at once the EU-25 can barely deploy 85,000, out of a total of 1. 2 trillion ground soldiers. 3 From both a defence devisers point of lot, and that of the taxpayer, Europes arm ies need 3 These ? ures do not include air force or urgent reform. ocean forces personnel. The total number of the US fortify forces is approximately 1. 4 million state. The 25 EU governments confirm almost 2 million universe in their total build up forces. Figures establish on estimates in the The armament Balance 2003-2004, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London 2004. Recent developments in Brussels Heisbourg, Freedman and OHanlon all agree that in dominancement a European approach to warfare is a good idea, provided collar basic conditions are met ?Europes two pre-eminent military powers, Britain and France, must take the lead in de? ning a European approach to war. several(prenominal) EU governments may balk at having to follow an approach that would be de? ned to a blown-up extent by British and cut doctrine. However, Europe is better off with a sound military doctrine than a meaningless governmental compromise. In their approach to warfare, Europ eans should learn from the US approach, and from American experiences in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. European armies should be able to work well with American soldiers.However, Europes armies do not contain to copy US forces in every respect. European defence ministries need to retain their traditional peacekeeping skills, spot simultaneously building up their war-fighting p wranglingess. The EU needs to develop the internal aspects of its security and defence policy. In finical, European governments work to think about how to join up the discordant policy instruments which they need in the fight against global terrorism. EU governments need to ensure that their law enforcement, foreign and defence policies work in concert more effectively.The good news is that NATO and the EU are already taking move that allow for help their members to develop a European approach to warfare. At NATOs 2002 Prague summit, President scrubbing called on the Europeans to increase their military power by creating a NATO solvent Force (NRF). European governments followed his lead, approving a plan for a force of 21,000 elite military man, backed by supporting air and sea components, to be ready by 2006. This force depart enable NATO to train in a serious shooting war, in addition to its current peacekeeping work.By the end of 2003, NATO governments had already committed 9,000 troops to the response force, including 1,700 French soldiers. The NRF pass on be generally European the US accounts for only 300 (3 per cent) of the troops so far committed. 4 uppercases message to its allies has been clear Europe must increase its ability to undertake tough war-? ghting tasks if NATO is to remain central to US defence policy. NATOs repartee Force is goading the Europeans to prepare some of their troops for the most demanding types of military mission. 4 Spain is the self-aggrandisinggest contributor to the NRF, with 2,200 troops.Germany is alter 1,100 soldiers. can vass Luke Hill, union launches triservice speedy Response Force, Janes Defence Weekly, October 22nd 2003. ? ? In February 2004, the British, French and German governments proposed that the EU should be able to deploy nightclub betrothal root words, each consisting of 1,500 troops, and deployable within two weeks. Each battle group would be able to draw on extensive air and naval assets, including transference and logistical support. The rule for these EU combat units is to give the UN the rapid reaction capability that it currently lacks. The UN usually manages to ? d peacekeepers who can practice of law a cease? re or peace accord. But it a great deal cannot ? nd troops available to form an intervention force. It needs to be able to draw on a few battalions which are ready and able to ? y into a con? ict zone and impose peace. For caseful, the UN was unavailing to intervene quickly enough in East Timor in 1999. The Bush administration is unlikely to provide the UN with U S forces for this kind of task. Currently the joined States has only two 6 A European way of war Introduction 7 See http//www. un. org/ Depts/dpko/dpko/ contributors/Countries SummaryFeb2004. df. 5 soldiers claimd in UN-run peacekeeping operations (out of a total of 42,000 soldiers, of which 3,650 are from the EU-25). 5 If the US is nonvoluntary to provide peacekeepers, it is even less likely to cause elite forces available for UN interventions. But the EU could be impulsive to help the UN countries such as Britain and France discombobulate highly trained forces which can move into a war-zone at short notice. And European governments care much more than the US does about the UNs ability to act in geographical welkins that may not be of fundamental strategic importance.This is why the EU sent a small UN-mandated intervention force to Bunia in Congo in June 2003. And in April 2004 the EU considered the possibility of sending a UN-backed intervention force to the Dafur field of Sudan, where more than 650,000 people had ? ed killings, rape and looting by Arab militias. EU defence ministers agreed to the battle group initiative at their coming together in April 2004. They now have until 2007 to establish these forces and may do so in three ways. First, a government could impute together a national battle group.Only France and Britain could do this easily, although Germany, Spain and Italy should be able to develop their own combat units. Second, relatively large countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands could become lead or fabric nations for a battle group. Smaller countries would then cede some troops or equipment to plug gaps that the lead rural could not ? ll. The third option would be for several countries to come together to form truly international units, similar to the Strasbourg-based Eurocorps, which unites soldiers from Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain.For a smaller realm which does not want to plug into a particular le ad nation, a multinational unit might be politically more appealing. For object lesson, the Nordic and Baltic countries could decide to form a Baltic battle group. But multinational battle groups need not be regional. The EUs non-aligned countries, for example, might want to form their own. Austria, Finland and Ireland are of similar military strength, and they could ? nd that co-operating with fellow neutrals or else than NATO members would avoid embarrassing questions regarding their neutral status.In any case the creation of these battle groups like the NATO Response Force should help Europeans to think more alike on how they conduct warfare. Moreover, this confinement should reinforce NATOs Response Force the equivalent troops would be available to the EU and NATO. During the summer of 2004, they EU allow set up a new agency. The defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments agency will try to do two things, both of which will help the Europeans to develop a common approach to defence. It will seek to improve European military capabilities and to enhance armaments co-operation among the member-states.Unlike a typical national armaments agency, this new body will not have a procurement budget. So a better short verbal description would be to call it a capabilities agency, since it will bring together the separate worlds of research, development and procurement. The agencys most important role will be political, in assessing member-states progress towards meeting their capability commitments. everywhere the last few years, the Europeans progress towards modernising and re-equipping their armies has been painfully slow.In 2002, EU governments agreed to a European capabilities action plan (ECAP), which committed them to acquiring various sorts of equipment, such as transport planes and precision-guided missiles. The agency will evaluate and report per year on the member-states progress towards meeting these commitments. At mar ch, the agency looks set to keep these reports confidential. That would be a shame. If those reports were made public, the agency could name and shame the member-states which renege on on pledges, and thus put them under pressure to deliver. 8 A European way of war Introduction 9Finally, European governments are imputable to reach agreement on an EU constitution in June 2004. This will probably include articles on structured co-operation, EU jargon for a process that allows a small group of member-states to move forward in the area of defence. Given that EU countries have, and will always have, very different military capabilities, closer co-operation amongst a smaller group reads sense. Quite unconnected from the much-documented transatlantic gap, there is also a large capabilities gulf mingled with EU member-states a gulf that will widen with the accession of ten new members in May 2004. A revised version of the engage protocol listing the criteria for joining structured co- operation can be represent at http//ue. eu. int/igcpdf/en/03/c g00/cg00057-re01. en03. pdf. and demanding nature of future missions. The EU undertook its ? rst military missions in Macedonia and Congo in 2003. These experiences have already helped defence ministries to biddingise which kinds of equipment they need most urgently, and what types of skills their troops should develop. Towards the end of 2004, the EU is due to take over the peacekeeping in Bosnia from NATO this mission will be extremely dif? ult, including, for example, the hunt for the indicted Bosnian Serb general, Radovan Karadzic. Much more than the Congo or Macedonia operations, Bosnia will be a crucial test of the EUs military mettle. The enlargement of the EU brings it closer to the arc of instability that runs around its eastern, south-eastern and southern ? anks. Romania and Bulgaria are hoping to join the EU in 2007, magical spell Turkey, Croatia and other countries of the westerly Balkans are likel y to enter at a later stage. The EU will therefore have many weak and malfunctioning states on its borders.It is bound to become more involved in countries such as Belarus, Moldova and Georgia. Across the Atlantic, US priorities will remain focused on countries such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea, and con? icts such as China-Taiwan and India-Pakistan. upper-case letter will be opposed to become too involved in con? icts around the EUs eastern and southern borders. The EU will need to develop a more effective set of policies for stabilize North Africa, the Balkans and the countries that lie between the Union and Russia. Many of these policies will involve trade, aid and political dialogue.But EU strategy towards its near foreign will also have to include a military component. Europeans should not expect the US to put out ? res in their own backyard. After all, the principal rationale for the Anglo-French initiative at St Malo in 1998 which begat the European Security and Defence P olicy was to improve the EUs poor performance in coping with the Balkan crises of the 1990s. The EUs efforts to tackle con? icts in its near abroad may require more than mere peacekeeping. For example, if the delicateThat said, the current wording of the blueprint constitution sets targets for participation in the avant-garde which are relatively piano to meet. For example, the draft says that one of the criteria for participation is to supply by 2007 all or part of a combat unit that can be deployed in between ? ve and thirty days. 6 In fact, these combat units are the same types of force as those envisaged in the battle groups plan that EU defence ministers approved in April 2004. However, some member-states will probably stay out of the structured co-operation, because they lack the assets or the ambition to take part.The defence inner circle will in some respects resemble the eurozone some countries remain foreign because they do not satisfy the criteria, and others becaus e they choose to do so. Structured co-operation will help the emergence of a European approach to warfare like the NRF and the battle groups, the concept encourages other countries to emulate what the British and French fortify forces do. The transatlantic case for a European way of war Innovations such as the NATO Response Force and the EU battle groups should, together with some institutional innovations, enhance Europes military clout.But probably the most important factor driving military reform in Europe will be the growing number 10 A European way of war Introduction 11 site in Kosovo turned into a civil war, the EU should be ready to intervene with forces that could separate the warring factions. In such situations, British soldiers would be fighting alongside those from France, Germany, Italy and Spain, but not necessarily with American troops. If the Europeans were able to undertake that kind of robust military intervention autonomously, transatlantic relations would bene fit. For the Pentagon would have one less region to worry about.Furthermore, the more effective the Europeans military graphics, the more likely is the US to use NATO not only for peacekeeping but also for high-intensity interventions. The future of EU defence policy All the authors of this pamphlet are worried about the risk of a transatlantic division of labour namely the idea that Europe should do the peacekeeping and America ? ght the wars. But they all reject that notion, both as a description of the present and as a prescription for the future. The experience of Iraq has already forced the US to rethink its approach to post-con? ict operations.Having sometimes sneered at them, the Pentagon is now learning that peacekeeping, nation-building, and counter-insurgency should play a larger role in its military doctrine. Mean term, as the EU takes on more military missions, its defence ministries are themselves engaged in a learning process. They are beginning to see that they will need more sophisticate equipment, and be prepared for serious combat missions. They know that they will not always be able to count on the US to do the war-? ghting for them. It is unbent that the US and Europe currently have very different doctrines and priorities.But experiences on the ground will probably encourage both sides to cover their respective weaknesses post-con? ict stabilisation for the US and war-? ghting for the Europeans. In the long run this may lead to some extent to doctrinal convergence. European soldiers already conduct peacekeeping operations very differently from American troops. They expend less effort on force protection, they fraternise more with locals and they are more reluctant to loose ? re-power. Europeans will also, inevitably, fight their wars differently from the Americans.Given their budgetary constraints, European defence ministries have no choice but to focus less than the Pentagon does on sophisticated technology and airpower, and more on the role of ground forces. But these differences of fury should not prevent the Europeans from defeating most of their prospective enemies. When the EU mounts an autonomous combat operation, it is likely to be against a small or medium-sized power with weak air defences. The Europeans do not plan to ? ght any large and wellequipped adversaries on their own. In such cases, European soldiers would ? ght alongside American troops.Finally, the rapid developing of EU internal security policy will affect defence policy. The March 2004 bombings in Madrid con? rmed the ability of al-Qaeda-style terrorist groups to strike at Europe. In order to track these groups, EU governments will have to piece together information from a variety of sources. They have pledged to stride up intelligence-sharing, and in March 2004 they appointed Gijs de Vries as the Unions ? rst anti-terrorism tsar. Since the terrorist threat comes from both within and removed the EU, the member-states can no longer aff ord to maintain 7 See Daniel Keohane the traditional notation etween external and and Adam Townsend, internal security. 7 In the most extreme cases, EU A joined-up EU security policy, CER countries may wish to deploy force against a Bulletin, December terrorist group that is based abroad, or against a 2003 January 2004. state that harbours terrorists. European defence policy is developing fast and a more distinctive European approach to warfare is bound to emerge in coming years. However, such an approach is paradoxically more likely to develop in NATO than in the EU itself. For most European defence ministries, NATO will continue to be the principal multinational 2 A European way of war military organisation. That is not only because NATO is a military alliance which the EU is not but also because of NATOs large and experienced military headquarters. More than 2,000 people work at NATOs strategic headquarters (Supreme Headquarters assort Powers Europe known as SHAPE) in Mo ns, Belgium, while the EU military staff in Brussels has fewer than 200 people. Moreover, NATO has regional command headquarters in Naples (Italy) and Brunssum (the Netherlands), as well as a fault headquarters in Norfolk (US), which focuses speci? ally on reforming NATOs armies. Put simply, European armies are reforming principally because of their collaboration in NATO, rather than the EU. The best example of this reform process is the NATO Response Force. Britain, France, Spain and Germany are See Kori Schake, leading the European contribution to this force, Constructive duplication reducing EU reliance on US while American participation is only symbolic. military assets, CER, Thus NATO is playing its part in promoting a January 2002. She proposed more ambitious but distinctly European way that the Europeans develop of war.The irony is that the NATO Response a strike force, similar to Force was an American idea, which the the NATO Response Force Europeans have enthusiastically e mbraced. 8 that governments agreed to 8 2 cornerstone the EU develop an effective military doctrine? Lawrence Freedman Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine which would de? ne the procedures to guide armed forces in future con? icts? EU governments have very different military strengths and diverse attitudes towards the use of military force. Those differences mean that the EU would produce a dysfunctional military doctrine, if it tried to create one.However, either acting together or separately, EU armies could make a distinctively European contribution to contemporary military operations. Britain and France should take the lead in de? ning that contribution. Their armed forces are the most capable and experienced in Europe, and have therefore had the opportunity to develop military doctrines that have been tried in the most dangerous types of operation. Any European military effort has to be compared with American military power. The US is in an unassailable mail fo r winning customary wars, as it did in Iraq in the spring of 2003.However, the problem of insurgents in Iraq has illustrated the extent to which the US has a dysfunctional military doctrine for unconventional warfare. Europeans should therefore not be obsessed with matching US military intrepidity. Europes conventional capabilities should be suf? cient to cope with most prospective con? icts, especially since the cases where they might ? ght wars without the Americans would be rare. Unconventional warfare has become the most signi? cant and demanding form of military operation, and in this area the Americans have a lot to learn from the Europeans. et up in November 2002. In the coming years, European governments should strengthen their military clout and conduct more ambitious autonomous military operations. But they should also improve the ability of their soldiers to work alongside Americans. As NATO evolves and reforms, the EUs security and defence policy will reap the bene? ts . Those who see the ESDP and NATO as competing and mutually exclusive concepts and there are a few such people, in some parts of the Pentagon and the French foreign ministry are living in the past.NATO and EU defence policy will sink or swim together, and on current trends they will swim. 14 Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 15 An EU military doctrine would be dysfunctional Countries ofttimestimes develop reputations for conducting their military campaigns in accordance with their national character. On this basis, northern Europeans would be cool and calculating, and southern Europeans romantic and impetuous, while the British would be pragmatic and stubborn. In practice, however, geo-strategic considerations are the biggest in? uence on national military doctrines.A cursory glance at 20th speed of light military campaigns backs up this point. In the 1960s, the Israelis knew they had to seize the initiative against Egypt, Jordan and Syria by striking ? rst if they had waited until they were attacked they would have been swamped. In the 1940s, the Russians could depend on territorial space and population mass to defend against the invading German army, while the Germans wanted to make the most of their qualitative advantages such as their superior equipment before the quantitative disadvantages began to tell.For maritime powers such as Britain and the US, the natural instinct has been to project sea and air power from a distance, and to rely on allies to range out the bulk of land warfare. To be relevant and effective, a military doctrine should draw on a view of the world and its problems make assessments of available military capabilities (including those of allies and enemies) and add minute ideas about strategy and tactics for the armed forces to follow. Thus, a doctrine should provide a framework in which armed forces can train, plan, conduct exercises, and generally work together in a mutually reinforcing way.The best doctrines orientate armed forces for the future, so that soldiers recognise the situations in which they will find themselves and know how to act. A commandants orders should be clear and well understood by his or her soldiers. By the same token, bad doctrine will lead to surprises and disorientation. In the worst circumstances, major(ip) lodgeations to the organisation of the armed forces and the conduct of military operations will be required, even in the midst of a war going badly. A doctrine emanates rom a political process, involving ministries, agencies, and armed services so any doctrinal changes will require dialogue between those disparate groups. Military doctrine, therefore, reflects the preferences of powerful voices within government and the armed forces, as well as the concerns of key allies. One consequence of a complex political process involving a range of competing inte confronts may be a dysfunctional doctrine. The risk of dysfunction grows during a prolonged full poin t of peace, which tends to spare doctrine from critical scrutiny.Only regular experience with combat and the last empirical test of war provide defence ministries with constant reality checks. The risk of a dysfunctional EU doctrine is high, mainly because it would require 25 governments and their respective defence establishments to compromise. If EU governments did agree on a common military doctrine, it would stem from a determination to demonstrate political unity and not from the need for a doctrine that would provide effective guidance in an actual difference of opinion.Furthermore, European governments have not yet developed a very successful EU foreign policy. And such a foreign policy is a precondition for EU success in the military sphere. No European soldiers will be deployed on EU military missions if the Unions governments cannot agree on their political neutrals. The impact of having several governments negotiate strategy documents, whether in the EU or NATO, is t o render those documents more bland and vague. The European Security Strategy, which EU leading approved in December 2003, illustrates that point (see Francois Heisbourgs chapter).Furthermore, these political processes have become even more perplex with the arrival of ten new EU members in May 2004. Both the EU and NATO are comely progressively unwieldy and less able to act swiftly and decisively in a crisis. But NATO has more chance of acting decisively, because of US leadership and the absence of the more paci? st EU neutrals (Austria, Finland, Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Sweden). In addition, most EU member-states have only limited experience of war-? ghting. With the excommunication of France, the enthusiasm in some 16 A European way of warCan the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 17 capitals for the Europeanisation of national armed forces too often appears to be directly related to a deep reluctance to use military force. Belgium is the most conspicuous exam ple of this tendency. Only Britain and France have recently had substantial military experience. Only London and Paris have had to think about the demands of high-octane missions. For example, aside from contributing to various military coalitions, Britain sent troops to Sierra Leone in 2000, while France deployed soldiers on its own to the Ivory Coast in 2002.Other EU member-states have participated in coalition wars or in peacekeeping operations which have sometimes been quite bruising experiences. And many EU governments are fashioning substantial contributions to operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. But a serious military doctrine should not only re? ect combat experience but also command experience. Countries like Germany and Spain are going through and through a useful military reform process, but their national doctrines remain limited compared to those of Britain and France, because they have less experience of commanding larger units of troops.Much contemporar y warfare is against opponents which do not represent a direct experiential threat, as did the Soviet Union, but rather cause chaos in the more fragile parts of the world. There may be a variety of reasons why one EU government might thumb obliged to get involved in a con? ict (such as lingering post-colonial ties), but equally many reasons why others might not. At present, there is no consensus in Europe on the purpose or the circumstances in which it is appropriate to use military force. There is, therefore, a risk that even if the EU had a military doctrine, re? cting the uncomplete views and meagre capabilities of most of its member-states, the governments would not agree on whether to participate in, or on how to conduct future EU operations. For some countries, like France and Austria, an EU brand might legitimise a military doctrine and future operations but for others, such as Denmark and some of the new EU members, it could have the opposite effect. For all these reasons, any attempt to turn the EU into a proper military organisation with a shared doctrine is bound to end in failure.However, a European approach to warfare does not have to be an EU approach. Instead, Europe could develop a way of war that builds on the experience of the major European military powers, namely Britain and France. There is something distinctive about the demanding nature of their past experiences and present contributions which could be a model for the rest of Europe. Furthermore, those European countries that have actively participated in recent operations, such as Spain, Italy, Poland and the Netherlands, also share this distinctive approach, at least to some full stop.Most wars are now fought by coalitions of the willing. International institutions the United Nations, NATO or the EU endow a degree of legitimacy on such coalitions, but do not run major wars themselves. The NATO management of the 1999 Kosovo war may be the exception that proves the rule. The real qu estion is which governments are ready to join a coalition to address a particular emergency. A key aspect of the answer to that question is the likely role that the US would play in leading such coalitions. American military doctrine is dysfunctionalUS military doctrine has become increasingly dysfunctional. The principal reason is the changed nature of modern warfare, rather than the convoluted political process in Washington. European commentators often make the mistake of equivalence de? ciencies in their own decision-making procedures to the complex and often acrimonious inter-agency process in Washington. The delays and confusion that the Washington process can cause are often serious. But there is an important difference with Europe in the US there is a single decision-maker the president who serves as the ? nal arbiter.All US armed services Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines have developed their own doctrines, often with scant regard for each 18 A European way of war Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 19 other. Nevertheless, ever since the US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975, an underlying confidence has given coherence and continuity to American military thinking. The fundamental arrogance guiding the Pentagon is that US armed forces should prepare for wars against other major powers. All other types of operation are secondary ones which America should, if at all possible, avoid. From this assumption ? ws the reason that American doctrine has become dysfunctional unambiguous conventional wars against major powers are becoming a rarity, while complicated small wars are becoming more common. There are two specific reasons behind the failure of existing American doctrine. First, the energy and resources which the Pentagon devotes to conventional forces have reached a point of diminishing marginal returns. Second, the Pentagon has washed-out too little effort on training soldiers for those unconventional operations that it laid-off as non-core business, but which are increasingly dominating Americas military efforts.The recent US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated that ? ? ? with increasing accuracy. This means that the interlock of overseas bases which the US established in Europe during the Cold War is becoming redundant. As a consequence, allies are often considered to be something of a nuisance, demanding major political inputs in return for minor military outputs. Donald 9 US Department of Defense Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defense, has newsworthiness Brie? ng in Warsaw with observed that in the current era the mission Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, September 25th 2002. hould determine the coalition, rather than the other way around. 9 NATOs Kosovo war did much to manufacture Americas attitudes towards its allies. NATO tried to achieve its objectives through an air campaign, which led to an exaggerated comprehension of the disparity between American and European military capabilit ies. Europeans could barely muster 15 per cent of the total air sorties. But to the intense irritation of the Americans, this gap did not stop the Europeans from demanding a big say over the selection of targets and the overall course of the war. The largest transatlantic row occurred when the British overnment pushed for a commitment to use ground troops if the air campaign continued to fail to produce results. The Clinton administration was deeply reluctant to pay a domestic political price for such a land campaign. It feared that US public opinion would be unwilling to earmark even modest casualties for what would be seen as marginal foreign policy objectives. Only Britains promise to commit up to 50,000 troops to an eventual(prenominal) land operation began to ease US objections. conventional victories are relatively easy to accomplish the West can easily achieve air dominance and the key military tests are increasingly found on the ground.In terms of conventional warfare, the US is now in a family unit of its own. This is hardly surprising since the US defence budget is equivalent to what the rest of the world spends collectively on defence. America also spends its defence money far more ef? ciently than European governments do. Even so, to occupy a country the size of Iraq with effectively only three combat divisions (each with between 10,000 and 18,000 soldiers), as the US did in April 2003, is remarkable. Furthermore, recent advances in defence technology have allowed American commanders to project lethal power over great distances EU defence too much process, not enough outputTransatlantic arguments over the Kosovo campaign had a major impact on European attitudes towards a common defence policy. By the end of the 1992-95 Bosnian war, European leaders were bear on about the United States limited commitment to resolving European con? icts. On the eve of the Kosovo war, in December 1998, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac held a summit at St Malo. They identi? ed a way 20 A European way of war Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 21 See Gilles Andreani, Christoph Bertram and Charles Grant, Europes military revolution, CER, 2001. 10 orward for European defence and the Kosovo war initially accelerated that process. 10 However, FrancoBritish momentum was soon lost, and resultant events in particular the quarrels over Iraq have highlighted once again the differences of view between Paris and London. The core issue in Europes defence debates is what relationship Europe should have with the US. To simplify somewhat but not excessively the French believe Europe must mounting its military game to provide a counterweight to the US. The main objective for the British is to be taken seriously in Washington and get a hearing for European views.In their respective approaches, the British have been more consistent. If there has been a British approach to warfare for the past 60 years, it has been to gear military capabilities to the level that is obligatory to gain an entree into Washingtons decisionmaking processes. France, however, has fluctuated between its readiness to embrace an alliance with the US and its rely to develop substitute(a)s. The problem for the French is that they cannot balance American power on their own, so they need to propose a mission for Europe as a whole.The French have often tried to get other European countries to sign up to this kind of project. But the countries that are inclined to support France do not possess substantial military assets and experience. This strategy looks forlorn unless Britain, Europes only other serious military power, collaborates with France. For both the French and the British, the improvement of European military capabilities is a necessary condition for further progress either to convince the Americans that their European allies can bring some hardware to the decision-making table, or else to set the fo undations for an alternative to NATO.The St Malo compromise also shows the limits of both the British and French positions. Blair agreed that the Europeans should be able to act without the Americans in contingencies involving neighbourhood crises although he assumed that the US would agree that the EU could use NATO assets. In return, Chirac accepted that the EU could not credibly expect to duplicate NATOs proviso and command capabilities. The Iraq row has not been fatal to the European defence initiative. A more serious problem for the EU is that its defence policy will lack heart without extra military capabilities and these have yet to materialise.European countries cannot move 11 vii European substantial forces with speed to anywhere governments are buying outside Europe. Only Britain has any serious, if 180 A-400M transport modest, transport capability while Germany planes but these are short had to use Ukrainian aircraft to carry its troops range rather than long range. Only the UK has to Afghanistan. Some improvements are in long range transport planes train, albeit painfully slowly. For example, the that can carry the ? rst of the A400M transport planes should be heaviest loads. delivered in 2009. 1 These limitations do not make Europe-only operations impossible. But EU missions are either going to be small, and in effect Britishled and/or French-led, or the Europeans will have to rely upon American support, as they do in the Balkans. At the moment, EU defence policy gives the impression of being yet another European initiative bogged down in endless and largely pointless wrangles about process. To sceptics, the defence debates in Brussels have little to do with preparing for warfare, and more to do with recuperative a ? agging European political project.This explains why the key innovations in EU defence policy tend to be about setting up new institutions in Brussels, rather than defence ministries buying new equipment. This general preoccupat ion in European capitals with form rather than content was apparent(a) in the debate over planning cells in 2003. In April of that year, France and Germany (together with Belgium and Luxembourg) proposed a European planning cell that would operate separately from NATOs command structures to the intense annoyance of Europes Atlanticist countries such as Britain. 22 A European way of warCan the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 23 In December 2003, EU governments agreed that the EU would deploy a small group of in operation(p) planners to SHAPE, NATOs planning headquarters near Mons. This group will work on ensuring a smooth relationship between the EU and NATO on Berlin-plus missions, when the EU borrows NATO assets. There will also be a new unit of about 30 operational planners for the EUs military staff, which currently consists mainly of strategic planners (their job is to advise EU foreign ministers on the operational plans that may come out of SHAPE or a national mil itary headquarters).The new unit will help with the planning of EU military and civilian missions which involve policemen. Given that there are very few places where Europeans could even think of acting militarily without a kind US attitude, and probably American logistical and intelligence support, the point of the Franco-German purpose was unclear. The fact that such proposals irritate Washington may be a bonus for some in Paris and Berlin, but it also strengthens the perception that the purpose of European defence policy has little to do with how armed forces might actually be used. articipated in operations abroad. Germany is an interesting example of this reform process. At the end of 2003 the German government decided to open frame the focus of its defence planning from territorial defence towards acting overseas. By 2010 Germany will have a 35,000-strong intervention force for combat operations and a 70,000-strong stabilisation force for peacekeeping. To pay for this, the Germans are sensibly getting rid of large stocks of weapons designed for con? icts that are now unlikely to materialise.There is little point in any European country maintaining large numbers of aircraft that can deliver only dumb bombs. The question of how European armies should work with American forces is crucial for the development of a European approach to warfare. But the terms of the Europeans defence debate need to change. In particular they need to get away from taking American military prowess as the standard by which all others are judged. There are three reasons for this. First, there are very few contingencies in which the Europeans could conjecture ? hting a major war without the US. The most serious military scenarios would be in Asia such as a future con? ict involving China. In these circumstances, it is inconceivable that European governments would act independently of the US. Moreover, when the Europeans did work with the Americans in a conventional war, the added value would be largely political rather than military. Second, comparing European military power with the US is both misleading and irrelevant. The massive American defence effort sets an impossible standard for Europeans to meet.European governments should not try to match the extravagant US force structure. Nevertheless, Europeans do need to attain their past promises to improve military capabilities, so that they they are not caught short in some future emergency. Crucially, this does not require a large additional financial commitment from European governments. The way forward for European defence Any attempt by governments to draw up an EU military doctrine would be fraught and probably futile. Instead, Britain and France should lead Europe in developing a European approach to warfare that is based on their recent campaigns.Other European states would have to be involved in that process, and be prepared to contribute. In many respects, British and French doctrine is alr eady quite mature and well geared for contemporary international conditions, especially when the task involves irregular war in weak or failing states. The British operation in Sierra Leone in 2000 and the French mission to the Ivory Coast in 2002 are examples of the types of operation which the EU can expect to undertake in the near future. Furthermore, British and French doctrine has already had a significant influence on those other EU countries that have 4 A European way of war Can the EU develop an effective military doctrine? 25 Furthermore, there is not going to be a transatlantic war, and the Europeans and Americans need to be able to work together. The surge in American military technology does create new problems for Europeans move to work alongside American soldiers on the ground. However, European governments should aim to develop armies that complement the US armed forces rather than copy them. Europeans will only act alone in those contingencies where the Americans do not see much of a role for themselves.Europeans cannot work directly against the Americans, or even take action in the face of deep American objections though the Americans can act against European objections. Unless a well-armed rogue state emerges near Europe, such as a nuclear-armed Iran, the most likely opponents of the EU will be in Africa or the Middle East and will have weak air defences. Such opponents would not be a serious match for European forces, especially if the Americans were assisting with logistics and intelligence. It is true that the Europeans could not have fought the Kosovo war without the US, at least not in the way the Americans fought it.But European governments could have fought that war differently, with a greater stress from the start on preparations for a land war. A modest number of high quality aircraft, especially in combination with welltrained professional forces, can be extremely effective. For example, during the 1980s the Iranians spent six yea rs outside Basra, unable to make headway against the Iraqi defences. In 2003, the British spent about eight days in that position. The conclusion is clear Europeans do not have to ? ght as Americans. Even if they wanted to, it would be altogether beyond their capabilities.But more importantly, in many contemporary con? icts they are better off ? ghting the European way. The third reason for not trying to copy the US is the dysfunctional nature of American military doctrine. present-day(a) American doctrine focuses on big threats and prepares US armed forces for capital-intensive rather than labour-intensive wars. But the conventional war stage of a conflict is shrinking, while the unconventional war stage which follows is expanding. Examples of this phenomenon are high-intensity policing in the Balkans, peacekeeping in Afghanistan, and the counter-insurgency operations in Iraq.Impressive US strides in conventional warfare are due to American cultural impatience a political prefere nce for quick results and technology-based solutions and the Pentagons desire to use maximum resources to keep casualties to a minimum. Irregular warfare requires more patience and puts greater pressures on frontline troops and junior of? cers. Soldiers also have to co-ordinate their efforts with aid workers and diplomats, as well as quell social unrest. In these cases, the enemy understands that it will be overwhelmed in regular war. But, with a determination ? ed by nationalism, ethnic vulnerability or ideology, the enemy can embarrass the Americans by adopting traditional insurgent tactics. Iraq is a particularly challenging example, for very speci? c historical reasons. The Iraq experience is posing the biggest test to American military prowess since Vietnam although it is not of the same proportions. The Americans have suffered heavily from a ? xation with force protection, which often leads to over-reaction by soldiers that pushes insurgents and locals together. A comparison between the American counter-insurgency operation in Baghdad and the British one in Basra in 2003-04 ? tters the British, because of the much more favourable political climate in southern Iraq. Nonetheless, it reinforces the view that the British have a better approach to this sort of campaign, in particular by understanding the importance of separating the insurgents and the local population. It is fair to say that Europeans are more skilled at this sort of campaign, in part because of the tradition of imperial policing, but also because of their more recent and extensive experience of peacekeeping. Because todays opponents are more likely to specialise in guerrilla warfare than tanks and aircraft, there is now a paradoxical situation. 6 A European way of war The United States reluctance to engage in unconventional wars has constrained its surplus of power. Both the Clinton and, initially, the Bush administrations desire to dampen expectations that the US would be willing and able to sort out every local con? ict. They were especially fearful of being wasted into a series of inconclusive and domestically unpopular foreign entanglements. But the events of September 11th 2001 created new imperatives for American activism. Washington now has major commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, and is ? nding it harder to limit those commitments.The days when the Pentagon could insist that it would not enter a con? ict without a clear exit strategy, and then pass on the thankless and demanding task of nation-building to others, have passed. This is already starting to have important consequences for doctrine development in the US. The Iraq experience shows that a new con? ict sequence is developing in which the length of the actual war is contracting, because there are few likely enemies able to withstand intense and precise ? repower. But the post-war activity, which can be both tough and deadly, may misdirect out almost inde? itely. The key question is not whether the Europeans can adapt to American doctrine, but whether the Americans can adapt to the European way of war. 3 The European Security Strategy is not a security strategy Francois Heisbourg At the Brussels summit in December 2003, European Union governments adopted a document entitled A secure Europe in a better world and subtitled European Security Strategy (hereafter referred to as the ESS). 12 In the spring of 2003, the governments had given the EUs High Representative for foreign policy, Javier Solana, a mandate to draw up this document.